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Abstract
For the past 30 years, the Chinese communication system has experienced
tremendous changes, which have brought it from the ultimate "propaganda machine" to a
striking contradictory mix of capitalist neoliberalism and socialist authoritarian
ideological indoctrination. Since the central hypothesis of my research focuses on the fact
that socialist Chinese media are undergoing capitalist neoliberal operations, the American
communication system, a very typical capitalist neoliberal corporate media system, is
contextualized. The thesis intends to explore the current Chinese communication system,
media phenomena, and media practices that have manifested contradictions. I also
attempt to find out the underlying drive to propel the historical transformation of the
Chinese media. I will employ political economy of communication to theorize and ground
my research. In order to lend further support to my argument, I will delineate a case study:
Xinwen Lianbo, a national news program on China Central Television (CCTV). Critical
Discourse Analysis (CDA) will be used to investigate the TV news discourse- Xinwen
Lianbo.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
For decades, Schramm's "Soviet Communist Theory of the Press" was widely
employed as a theoretical framework and guideline to investigate press systems in the
communist world in general and China in particular (Huang, 2003; Yin, 2006). In the
Soviet Communist model, media are treated as the ultimate "propaganda machine"
(Herman and Chomsky, 1988) which is regarded as an apparatus of ideological control
and political manipulation. China did originally imitate the former Soviet Union model to
centrally control its communication system in Mao Zhedong's (the first president of new
China) era (1949-1976). It is noteworthy that Chinese media have experienced
tremendous changes since China's reform. The opening up policy was launched in 1978
and as a result the media are by no means the same propaganda machine as they used to
be. David Harvey (1995) looks upon the years 1978-1980 as "a revolutionary
turning-point in the world's social and economic history" (p.l), stating that the China has
transformed "from a closed backwater to an open centre of capitalist dynamism with
sustained growth rates unparalleled in human history" (p.l). In this historical context, one
would never achieve a satisfactory and compelling analysis by employing the Soviet
Communist model to investigate the contemporary Chinese media system.
Media in democratic societies are supposed to, as Ehrenreich (2000) suggests, bring
the public "a wealth of diverse opinions and entertainment options", provide the
"information we need to function as informed citizens", and offer a platform for people to
"have a chance to voice their concerns" (p. 10). Put another way, democratic media can
play the significant role of "the Fourth Estate", acting as protectors of the public interest
and guardians of the "public sphere". The Chinese media system also is far from meeting
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the requirements for a democracy.
On the contrary, I hypothesize that the current Chinese communication system is a
striking contradictory mix of capitalist neoliberalism and socialist authoritarian
ideological indoctrination. It is no better than a pure Soviet Communist model in that the
current Chinese people have to endure socialist ideological indoctrination saturated with
material commercialism. Therefore, it is necessary to problematize the current Chinese
communication system.
Since the central hypothesis of my research is concerned with this contradiction,
there is a need to foreground a typical capitalist neoliberal communication system. I
believe that the American communication industry is a very typical, if not the most
representative, corporate media system. My research will thus first contextualize the
current American media environment, which is arguably an advertising saturated, highly
concentrated, and entirely profit driven communication system, and then explore the
reasons and myths behind it. Then, I will investigate the Chinese communication system
and reveal its contradictory combination of capitalist neoliberalism and socialist
ideological control. Political economy of communication will be employed as both a
theoretical framework and primary theoretical method to explore and examine the two
communication systems. A case study will be presented here to lend further support to my
theoretical outlook on the Chinese media environment. A Critical Discourse Analysis will
be carried out to investigate Xinwen Lianbo (National Network News), the most important
daily news program for both China Central Television (CCTV), China's largest and most
prestigious state-run TV network, and the Chinese government.
1.1 Research questions and the significance of the research
Since my thesis intends to examine the contradictions of the Chinese communication
2

system, the major research questions of my thesis are how the socialist Chinese
communication system, like its American counterpart, impels capitalist neoliberalism on
one hand, and while also serving to indoctrinate authoritarian socialist ideology on the
other hand. I will also explore how the Chinese government both brings in and constrains
the market's influence, and how capitalist commercialism and neoliberalism both benefit
and challenge the socialist Chinese government. In addition, I will try to examine how the
Chinese government and its media organs use the myth, "socialism with Chinese
characteristics", to skillfully explain and justify these contradictions. Further, I will also
attempt to find out the underlying impetus for the historical transformation of the Chinese
communication system from Schramm's "Soviet Communist" media to today's media
environment.
Kincheloe and McLaren (2005) point out that exposing the contradictions, which are
generally accepted by the dominant culture as natural and inviolable, will lead the
researchers to the source of emancipatory actions (p.306). Smythe and Van Dinh contend
that critical research can help to re-shape the "established order" to better serve the
majority of the public (cited in Hamilton, 2006). Habermas casts the relationship between
critical theorists and society as analogous to the relationship between psychoanalysts to
their patients, and thinks that critical theorists possess power to help emancipate a
problematic society (cited in Miller, 1995). Also, Jansen (2002) claims that the mandate
of "media-critical theory" is able to "link critical scholarship to struggles for meaningful
forms of social and political freedom" (p. 18). As Hackett, R. & Carroll (2006, p. 12) put it,
"democracy is neither a final and permanent state of affairs, nor a gift handed down from
elites; it requires continual renewal from below and from the margins". China, a
dominated and controlled by the Communist Party, requires a more democratic and much
3

more open communication system. The Chinese people are struggling for a more
democratic environment in the long run. Therefore, my main purpose for this work is not
just to be critical and fussy about the some problems associated with both the American
and Chinese communication systems, I hope this research will help to motivate the
transformation of the Chinese media and social system.
While the literature that is attentive to the problems of both American corporate
media and the Chinese communication system is broad and expansive, this work is
significant in at least the following three aspects. Firstly, this thesis will systematically
analyze the historical transformation of the Chinese media and investigate the current
contradictory Chinese mediascape and will contribute to the existing literature on the
Chinese media and democracy. Secondly, this work connects American media and
Chinese media and invites attention to be paid to the fact that the communication systems
of both the world's strongest capitalist economy- the United States and the largest
socialist country- China value, spur, and impel neoliberalism, and stand as symbols for
the comprehensive proliferation of neoliberalization on the world stage. Finally, for a
more detailed perspective, the case study of China Central Television's Xinwen Lianbo
(National Network News), which is the party's most significant news "mouthpiece", will
demonstrate how the Chinese media function as the ultimate "propaganda machine" to
advance the agendas of ruling powers. By performing a critical discourse analysis on this
program, I will provide a more vivid picture of the political economy of the Chinese
media environment.
1.2 Thesis outline
The political economy of communication, which is employed as theoretical
framework and primary theoretical approach for my research, is mainly based on the
4

work of Vincent Mosco (1996). Chapter Two introduces and conceptualizes the political
economy of communication and the three entry points of Vincent Mosco (1996). The
origins, philosophical assumptions and intellectual lineage of the political economy of
communication will be delineated to give a full explanation of the theoretic paradigm.
Chapter Three uses the three pillars, including commodification, spatialization, and
structuration, to de-center American communication system and to expose some major
problems hidden in the political economy of American media. Theories and concepts
about deregulation, myths, ideology, and neoliberalism are discussed to help to demystify
the problems underlying the American mediascape. Chapter Four examines the recent
historical transformation of Chinese media from a historical perspective. Basically, I
divide this part into two periods of time: Mao Zhedong's era (1949-1976) and the
post-Mao period (1978-now). The two contradictory aspects of capitalist neoliberalism
and socialist ideological indoctrination will be separately delineated by demystifying
"socialism with Chinese characteristics". Chapter Five focuses on the methodology
incorporated in my research. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is introduced and
elaborated to serve as a guide to carry out my research about Chinese media. Chapter Six
introduces general news discourses on CCTV and performs a CDA of Xinwen Lianbo.
CDA will help me to reveal how Chinese media use discourses that reflect the political
manipulation of the government. Chapter Seven will provide analyses and conclusions
from this research.

5

Chapter 2: Political Economy of Communication as Theoretic Framework
McChesney (2000) argues that "the political economy of communication is uniquely
positioned to provide quality analysis of the most pressing communication issues of our
era" (p.l 10). As Calabrese (2004) contends, the political economy of communication has
made important contributions to a variety of theory and practice relating to media
industries, policies, and political and cultural theories about "the institutional pressures
and constraints on public discourse and the public sphere" (p. 10). Equally important,
"political economy has an historic commitment to praxis, or the unity of research and
social intervention" (Mosco, 1999, p. 104). That is, it motivates scholars to work with
commitment to social change. Therefore, my thesis will use political economy of
communication perspective to theorize and ground my research.
2.1 Political Economy in the Historical Perspective
Mosco (1996) provides an overview of definitions of political economy. According to
Mosco (1996), before political economy became a science, it meant the social custom,
practice, and knowledge about how to manage the household first, and, later, the
community (p.24).
Specially, the term 'economic' is rooted in the classical Greek Oikos for 'house' and nomos
for 'law', hence, economics initially referred to household management. [...] 'Political'
derives from the Greek term (polis) for the city-state, the fundamental unit of political
organization in the classical period. Political economy therefore originated in the
management of the family and political households (Mosco, 1996, p. 24).

In 1913, as the original Palgrave (1913, p. 741) suggested, 'although the name
political economy is still preserved, the science, as now understood, is not strictly
political: i.e., it is not confined to relations between the government and the governed, but
deals primarily with industrial activities of individual men' (as cited in Mosco, 1996). In
1948, the Dictionary of Modern Economics defined political economy as "the theory and
6

practice of economic affairs", noting that emphasis has been shifted in economics, such as
market values and questions of equilibrium of the individual firm, without stressing the
political (Mosco, 1996). More recently, economics and political economy have emerged
as separate, almost oppositional, approaches. Economics has become a technical science
which does not question the underlying assumptions about capitalism.

Political

economy exists to question those assumptions.
Literature in contemporary field of political economy of communication is expansive,
many prominent and influential scholars such as Nicholas Garnham, Dan Schiller,
Herbert Schiller, Robert McChesney, Ben Bagdikain, Robin Mansell and Vincent Mosco
define the field. Before diving into the definition of the contemporary political economy
of communication, I firstly address the origins, philosophical assumptions and intellectual
lineage of the theoretic paradigm.
2.2 The Origins of Contemporary Political Economy of Communication
Dan Schiller (1999) argues that the origins of contemporary political economy of
communication bear distinctive anti-fascist characteristics. By revisiting the contributions
of the economist Robert A. Brady, Schiller (1999) provides an orienting picture of the
origin of the political economy of communication. As Schiller (1999) points out,
throughout 1930s and 1940s, Brady, along with Max Horheimer and Robert Lynd etc,
warned against the danger that big business had gained increased external influence
throughout society and discerned a frightening potential of authoritarianism in the ability
of big businesses to manipulate people's mind. The fact that big businesses had
interwoven with each other, with state agencies, and even with military and religion
organizations lends substantial credence to Brady (1937, pp.83, 84, 362), who relates the
Nazi propaganda machine of Germany to the spirit of advertising and American "public
7

relations counselors" and contends that fascism represents the most "politically conscious
phase" threatening the industrialized world (as cited in Dan Schiller, 1999).
Within this larger historical context, the communications media were one key channel, among
others, all of which were exploited by an increasing consciously antidemocratic command
structure committed to maintaining its own rule. This galvanizing insight, and much of the
problematic within which it was encased, was carried over by the forerunners of the political
approach to communication. (Dan Schiller, 1999, p.97)

Some other pioneers and central figures such as Dallas W. Smythe and Herbert I.
Schiller, carried over the anti-fascist framework that Brady established, and helped to
frame a tradition of political economy of communication (Dan Schiller, 1999).
2.3 The Philosophical Assumptions of Political Economy of Communication
In her book of Communication Theories: Perspectives, Processes, and Contexts,
Miller (1995) summarizes the metatheoretical framework of critical theories. Although
critical approaches have taken various ontological positions, most critical theorists take a
more subjective stance of the ontological scale, which is informed by the German idealist
perspective. Miller (1995) contends the epistemological stance of critical theorists is the
critical-emancipatory cognitive interest of Habermas, in which he regards knowledge as
"serving the interests of change and emancipation" (p.73). In contrast to the value-free
axiological commitment of positivists, critical theorists insist that "values should guide
scholarship" and "theorists should work as change agents in supporting those values"
(Miller, 1995, p.74). Also, as Slack and Allor (1983) note, critical research approaches
including political economy of communication "address the role of communication in the
role of the exercise of social power" and "have developed in opposition to liberal/pluralist
social theory" (p.270).
To better understand the metatheoretical framework or philosophical assumptions of
political economy of communication, and of critical theories as a whole, it is necessary to

8

explicate Marxism and cast light on the threads between "Orthodox Marxism" and
"Hegelian Marxism" (Kellner, 1989, p.ll; Miller, 1995), which is also called
"neo-Marxism". Orthodox Marxism, at its core, tends toward a reductionistic
'economism', which believes that economic base determines the superstructure and laws
of history, embedded in the economy, determines the trajectory of all social life (Kellner,
1989, p.ll). This version of Marxism is scientific because it claims "the status of a
science of social development" and tending to "be dogmatic as it congealed into a rigid
system of categories, laws and positions" (Kellner, 1989, p.ll). In contrast, Hegelian
Marxists regarded the capitalist society as a system and emphasize the importance of
subjective factors in historical development. Their "more philosophical, more
sophisticated view of history" rules out "a scientistic, determinist model" and stresses
"contradictory sets of social relations and struggles in a specific historical era, whose
trajectory could not be determined with certainty in advance" (Kellner, 1989, p.l 1).
Drawing on Morrow (1994) and Burrell & Morgan (1979), Miller (1995) also contends
that the Frankfurt School did not follow the school of scientific Marxism which employed
positivistic methodology and instead adhered to Hegelian Marxism in advocating a
"revolution of consciousness" (p.69). Also, Jansen (1983) uses "vulgar (mechanical)
Marxism" to refer to orthodox Marxism and contends that "'critical' theorists sought to
distance their perspective from vulgar (mechanical) Marxism and to establish kinship
with the Hegelian and philological roots of Marx's conceptions of alienation,
consciousness, and ideology" (p.344).
Therefore, the political economy of communication, like most of the other critical
theories, informs a social constructionist ontology, epistemologically believes in its
critical, emancipatory potential, and axiologically focuses on revealing alienating power
9

relations.
Additionally, political economy of communication has intellectual roots in the
Frankfurt School. As Bettig (2002) concludes, "contemporary critical approaches to the
study of the political economy of communications continue in the Frankfurt School
tradition by seeking to put the media within a broader historical, economic, and normative
context" (p.84). For my proposed thesis, I mainly draw on Nicholas Garnham (1990),
Robert McChesney (2000), and Vincent Mosco (1996) to conceptualize the contemporary
political economy of communication.
2.4 The Definition of the Political Economy of Communication
Nicholas Garnham (1990) argues political economy is "always concerned with
analyzing a structure of social relations and of social power. But it is particularly
concerned to analyze the peculiarities of that system of social power called capitalism"
(p.7). Garnham(1990) argues political economy of communications and culture rejects
methodological individualism and argues that human beings are essentially social. He
contends that human social actors should be considered in the process along three
dimensions, such as "interaction with the material environment-the process designated
with Marxist theory as labour", "interaction with other human actors for the purposes of
social coordination", and "interaction with the self - the identification and maintenance of
self identity through projection" (p.9). Garnham (1990) also manifests the
interrelationship between these dimensions in the process called "structuration".
McChesney (2000, 2004a) argues the political economy of communication entails
two main dimensions:
First, it addresses the nature of the relationship between media and communication systems
on the one hand and the broader social structure of society. In other words, it examines how
media and communication systems and content reinforce, challenge or influence existing
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class and social relations. It does this with a particular interest in how economic factors
influence politics and social relations. Second, the political economy of communication
looks specifically at how ownership, support mechanisms (e.g. advertising) and government
policies influence media behavior and content. This line of inquiry emphasizes structural
factors and the labor process in the production, distribution and consumption of
communication. (McChesney, 2000, p. 110; McChesney, 2004a, p. 43)

A more general and ambitious definition is that "political economy is the study of
control and survival in social life" (Mosco, 1996, p.26). Specifically, Mosco (1996), in
the very much same way as Garnham (1990), conceptualizes political economy as "social
relations, particularly the power relations, that mutually constitute the production,
distribution and consumption of resources" (p. 26). Mosco (1996) emphasizes the issues
of power relations, and is significantly concerned with how the media entities, elites, and
"those who govern" interact to exercise and circulate the political economy of power.
Vincent Mosco's The Political Economy of Communication: rethinking and renewal
(1996) is "the most detailed and accessible introduction" to the subject of the political
economy (Calabrese, 2004, p.l). Calabrese (2004) continues, explaining that "of more
importance at this historical moment is the attention Mosco pays to the political in
political economy, noting how the discipline and language of contemporary economics
have evolved to profess value neutrality" (p. 2). Significantly, three entry points, such as
commodification, spatialization, and structuration, which Mosco (1996) precisely defines
can be used to investigate the political economy of American communication system.
Therefore, my analysis of both capitalist American and socialist Chinese communication
systems will mainly adhere to the theoretical core of Mosco (1996)'s political economic
of communication. More specifically, I draw from the work's treatment of
commodification, spatialization, and structuration to describe the American media.

11

Chapter 3: Political Economy of American Media: Myths and Neoliberalism
Currently, five media conglomerates, what Bagdikian (2004) calls as "the big five",
control the media operated by the fifty media corporations twenty five years ago or so.
The five most influential and powerful media giants are Time Warner, Disney, Viacom,
News Corporation, and Bertelsmann, which "hunger for the $236 billion spent every year
for advertising in the mass media and the approximately $800 billion that Americans
spend on media products themselves" (Bagdikian, 2004, p.29). This transformation from
the big fifty to "the big five" typically symbolizes the processes of American media
concentration and convergence. Now "the big five" operate "perfectly" as oligopolies.
McChesney (1999) identifies two benefits for the media oligopolies: first, a bigger share
of the market allows them to lower overhead and gain more bargaining power with
suppliers; second, a larger share of market permits a handful of conglomerates to gain
more control over the prices for their products (p. 16). In addition, it is extremely hard for
a new player to enter the oligopolistic media market.
As Mosco (1999) notes, North American political economy has traditionally paid
considerable attention to media concentration. Political economy of communication can
be used to expose how media ownership, political powers, policies, economic factors,
social relations and media content etc interact to define the current American mediascape.
I spotlight Mosco (1996)'s three pillars to expose the mechanisms and operational logic
of the current U.S. media.
3.1 Commodification
Mosco (1996, p. 140) regards commodification as "the way capitalism carries out its
objective of accumulating capital or realizing value through the transformation of use
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value into exchange values." Baker (2002) also suggests that "market exchange
commodifies the good exchanged" (p.64). Specifically, the process of commodification in
the context of communication concerns "transforming messages, ranging from bits of data
to systems of meaningful thought, into marketable products" (Mosco, 1996, p. 146).
Literally, commodification transforms every single item in "culture industry" (Adorno &
Horkheimer, 1977) into a commodity possessing market value. Commodification is
overwhelmingly saturated in the hyper-commercialized, neoliberal, and highly converged
American media environment. "Most mass media are products generated by the economic
order" (Baker, 2002, p.65). Herman (1995) states every single aspect of culture involves a
process of commodification and links to the sale of goods. For example, sports have
become the apparatuses for marketing and are totally commercialized. "Pauses in the
game are dictated as much by advertising needs as by the demands of the participants"
(Herman, 1995, p. 6). Advertising is presented in everywhere in the stadiums and on
players' attire as well.
Wasko's(2004) analysis of sources of revenues of the film industry delineates the
different marketable products and markets. Briefly, these products/markets are theatrical
exhibition, home video (VHS/DVD), cable television (pay cable/ pay per view), TV
programs (broadcast TV/ advertiser-supported cable), foreign markets, non-theatrical
markets (airlines in-flight entertainment), merchandising (video games/ music/
publishing), and new media outlets (Internet/ video-on-demand/ mobile sets). Through
commodification, Hollywood's "same old stuff' (Meehan, 2007, p. 25) can realize profits
through various platforms and outlets years after their initial release.
To borrow Mosco's (1996) line, the process of commodification incorporates "the
media industries into the capitalist economy not primarily by creating ideologically
13

saturated products but by producing audiences" (p. 149). Gandy Jr. (2004) illustrates the
relationship between advertisers and audiences in the value chain of the media industries,
stating that "advertisers are consumers of audience attention, not content", and
"advertisers think of audiences as markets, but they purchase access to them as
commodities" (p.329). Audience members are treated more like commodities and
consumers rather than citizens who are entitled to enjoy the comprehensive, accurate, fair
reporting of the news rather than low quality journalism aiming to generate profit. As
Wittebols (2008) puts it, the American news media "serve the interest of profit over
citizen education" (p. 18).
It has to be stressed that social values and roles are often perverted by overwhelming
commodification. Baker (2002) contends that "commodification changes, sometimes
worsens, the experience of receiving access to culture and entertainment", insisting that
cultural resources should be available through "social interactions", which are defined by
"solidarity, honesty, giving, and willingness to search for answers", rather than "market
transactions", which are based on people's "ability to pay" (p. 66).
3.2 Spatialization
Mosco (1996) defines spatialization as "the process overcoming the constraints of
space and time in social life" (p. 173). In Mosco (1999), spatialization is depicted as "the
process of transforming space with communication" (p. 103). Spatialization is not a recent
concept or theory. Over a century ago, Karl Marx suggested that the power of capitalism
could "annihilate space with time" (as cited in Mosco, 1999, p. 105). Mosco generalizes
two reasons why spatialization is of importance for the political economy of
communication. The first reason is that communication processes and technologies play a
central role in the spatialization process, and second, spatialization is of particular
14

significance in the communication industries (Mosco, 1996, p. 173). Herman (1995)
responds to the first reason that Mosco (1996) poses, saying that "[the] development of
the computer and new telecommunications technologies has allowed markets to expand
more rapidly: spatially, into new product-service areas, and in new applications in
traditional sectors" (emphasis added, p.3). That is, new innovations in information
technologies and telecommunication fields have accelerated the process of spatialization
and expanded the market in the field of communication.
American global media conglomerates, with strong economic power and cutting-edge
technological advantages, can easily overcome "the constraints of space and time" to
realize global operations. Digital technologies such as high-speed Internet and
communications satellite transmission further facilitate spatialization processes.
Hollywood blockbusters can simultaneously be released in multiplexes in different
countries across the world. Examining the process of spatialization can reveal how media
conglomerates freely monetize audiences across all media outlets on the world stage.
Through spatialization, Time Warner, the world's largest media conglomerate, is a
leader in creating digital content and pioneering in digital distribution across all media
platforms, including internet, cable, motion pictures, home video entertainment and
mobile phones. As Richard D. Parsons, Chairman of the Board and CEO, and Jeffery L.
Bewkes, President, COO, recently stressed, "there's no more important strategic priority
for our businesses' future success than making the most of the growing digital
opportunities" (Time Warner, 2007). The strategy aims to build branded media content for
consumers whenever and however they access news, entertainment, animation, games
and whatever other information the company produces. Spatialization brings great
benefits for Time Warner. According to the company's website, 114 million domestic
15

internet users log on to the AOL network of web properties and 1.8 billion messages were
sent across AOL's messenger networks every day; CNN.com is the number one news and
information site in its share of the online news audience; TNT and Adult Swim are both
number one in their respective markets.
Thanks to the digital technologies, Clear Channel takes "fake local broadcasting to
new levels" (Klinenberg, 2007, p.65). Clear Channel has centralized its studios and has
been accused of staging "local news" for different cities from far away those studios. In
order to cut costs and become more profitable, the radio company feeds listeners very
much the same content across a geographically wide region with scarce local community
news, few voices, and sparse "hometown's offerings."
Synergy speeds the process of spatialization and allows for more "efficient" forms of
commodification- recirculation, repackaging, revisioning, recycling and redeployment- to
fatten the profits of media behemoths (Meehan, 2005). Quality journalism is expensive,
therefore, corporate media fill program holes with inexpensive recirculation, repackaging,
and revisioning of programs. "The same old stuff' is made to appear new by redefining
creativity (Meehan, 2007, p. 25). In earlier work, Meehan (1991) analyzed the synergistic
practices of Time Warner's Batman, uncovering how the company utilized the character
throughout a wide variety of media outlets, including cable network, books, music videos,
animation, theme parks, and soundtracks (as cited in Bettig, 2002). The American big
media players all, to some extent, recirculate, repackage, revision, and recycle their
content across their own different media outlets.
Digitization and spatialization have thus enabled media conglomerates to have a
global reach and to reap globally generated profits.
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3.3 Structuration
Mosco (1996) describes structuration as a "process by which structures are
constituted out of human agency, even as they provide the very 'medium' of that
constitution", emphasizing that "social class is real as both a social relationship and
instrument of analysis"(p.215). Therefore, structuration centers on social class and
highlights how a communication system can reinforce class relations.
American media were supposed to be public utilities or public domains which could
provide informative content and democratic debates representing issues of common
interest. Thanks to structuration, mass media institutions distinguish "between desirable
and undesirable audiences that are correlated with ethnicity, race, and class" (Gandy Jr.,
2004, p. 330). Herman and McChesney (1997) note media corporations focus only on
affluent audiences which are the target of advertisers. In the same way, Baker (2002)
notes that "a market distributes goods based on people's willingness and ability to pay"
and "it 'weights' preferences on the basis of the money placed behind them" (p.71). As
Hackett and Carroll (2006) suggest, in the profit-oriented commercial media environment,
"access to media services and information which enable full political and economic
participation is limited to those who can afford it" (p.6). Fairness & Accuracy in
Reporting (FAIR), the American media watchdog group, conducted a study on the guest
list of forty months of Nightline's programming in 1989 that still stands today as a
demonstration of media criticism (Hart, 2005). Overall, 80 percent of the program's
guests were government officials, professionals, or business representatives, and only 5
percent represented public interest groups, in addition, all of the top nineteen guests were
men and all but two were white (Hart, 2005, p. 52). Of course, the concerns of those who
have power and money will always be addressed most vigorously.
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It is not new that American mainstream media exert implicit pressure on editors and
reporters to shape content to cater to advertisers, the rich, and the elite. This means media
practitioners must produce more consumer friendly content to attract "more people who
have money and who live in the suburbs" (McChesney, 1999, p.55). In Detroit, the "last
full-time labor reporting position at the Detroit Free Press was eliminated in 1998, while
the newspaper added fifteen new editorial positions in the suburbs" (McChesney, 1999,
p.55). Media content targeting African Americans are likely to be characterized by lower
editorial quality and production values, because African American audiences are not
valued as highly as rich white ones and they have less consuming capacity (Gandy Jr.,
2007).
The interaction of commercialism and structuration deeply affects programming in
ways that favor primarily the elite class and advertisers, while marginalizing minorities,
the old and poor, and undermining the democratic discourse. Examining class divisions
helps to find out how the deeply commercialized American media serve mainly the elite
class and political incumbents, but neglect the marginalized.
The three political economy entry points, very much interlocking and meshing with
each other, present a problematic and undemocratic American media environment.
To understand the current American communication system, we must look at its
larger historic and political contexts. Arguably, deregulation results in media
concentration and convergence. Understanding how deregulation was executed in the US
also requires a discussion of myths and neoliberalism. I will thus map the origins of
deregulation and two important concepts- myths and neoliberalism, which are also key to
understanding the Chinese media system. Briefly, myths and neoliberalism help to
rationalize deregulation and maintain the corporate dominated American media system.
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3.4 Deregulation
American media policy has long been the centre of great public concern. The U.S.
Congress and Federation Communications Commission (FCC), along with other
regulatory departments, have enacted a series of regulations over the years to try to
maintain the significant industry.
For decades, the American media industry had been regulated by the 1934
Communication Act (Horwitz, 2005). In this Act and subsequent legislation and court
decisions, communication was to serve the public interest and was obligated to contribute
to democratic functions (Kellner, 2004). But "a combination of the growth of new
technologies, administrative irrationalities, and tough corporate lobbying and legal
challenges from large users and would-be entrants, prompted the FCC to relax some
regulations and permit new communications services to blossom" (Horwitz, 2005, p.30).
Horwitz continues, stating that the new services in turn spotlighted the inadequacy of
existing communication regulation and "made communications an industry open to the
ideology and practice of deregulation" (p.30). The first major break in the traditional
regime was the 1982 Consent Decree, which hastened technological convergences and
effaced the regulatory separations between the different parts of media industry. The 1996
Telecommunication Act was the second bold shift and also the first comprehensive
revision of Communications Act of 1934. The act redrew the policy map by changing the
goals and mechanisms of U.S. media regulation. The major change was that the public
interest would be maintained by competition rather than by regulation (Horwitz, 2005).
Wilson (2000) comprehensively analyzes the deregulation of telecommunications in
North America and brings up the three reasons that drove Reagan to reform "big
government": First, in the 1970s the yearly rate of inflation rose to 7.5 percent; some
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years it even reached double-digit levels; Second, social welfare expenditures by the
American government comprised 57.9 percent of government spending, and were 19.9
percent of the gross national product (GNP); the third reason is the rise of consumerism.
In the United States "by the Reagan administration and subsequent regimes, much of the
broadcasting regulatory apparatus was dismantled" (Kellner, 2004, p.30).
The 1996 Telecommunications Act lifted regulations, dramatically loosened
ownership limits or restrictions from commercial media, and was supposed to encourage
market competition (McChesney, 2004b; Horwitz, 2005; Wilson, 2000). A company could
now own radio licenses that cover the entire United States for the first time, a single
company may own broadcast TV licenses offering services to 35 percent of the national
market (Wilson, 2000, p. 167). As its core, the act presumed the "market could regulate
media more efficiently and fairly than ownership policies could" (McChesney, 2004b,
p.53). But the notion that the 1996 Telecommunication Act could promote fair
competition was under serious doubt from the outset. The deregulated communication
system seemed not to "generate thousands of programs targeting highly variegated
cultural tastes and made available through media venues that would compete fiercely to
serve us" (Meehan, 2007, p. 26). Instead, deregulation greatly encouraged cross-platform
integrations, mergers, and acquisitions. The U.S. media industry has become significantly
more concentrated since 1996 (McChesney, 2004b; Horwitz, 2005; Kellner, 2004).
American corporate powers, thanks to the continuous efforts to promote deregulation,
have come to dominate media and become increasingly powerful. Media conglomerates
took over the airways to advance their business agendas rather than to serve the
democratic purposes of mass media.
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3.5 Myth matters
Myth, as Barthes (1972) notes, "has the task of giving an historical intention a natural
justification, and making contingency appear eternal" (p. 155). Myth works well with
ideology and discourse to establish hegemonic power relations in a neutral way. Mosco
(2004b) suggests that value of myths is not determined by whether they are empirically
true or false, but by whether they are living or dead. Myths are kept alive by "social
practices that involve the leadership of storytellers whose accomplishments in one arena
give them a platform to promote myths" (Mosco, 2004b, p.215). It can be seen that the
power of political leaders and business elites enables them to proliferate myths beneficial
to their own interests. Chair of the Board of Directors and CEO of Time Warner Richard
D. Parsons, who personally has been friendly with former Secretary of State Colin L.
Powell and his son Michael K. Powell, the FCC chairman (Ruterberg & Lyman, 2001),
has the ability to mythologize about deregulation and neoliberalism and to lobby the
regulators to permit the AOL and Time Warner merger. In the same way, the Chinese
media, under the instruction of the political powers, propaganda the mythological
"socialism with Chinese characteristics" and use the same tactics to rationalize capitalist
neoliberal operations in a "socialist" system. Therefore, neoliberalism is a living myth in
both the U.S. and China.
Myths about deregulation and neoliberalism are well circulated in the discourse of
American mainstream media. It is never hard to discern the mythological implications
embedded in the deregulation of the telecommunication field and the corporate media
system.
Mosco (1990) assesses the mythological dimensions of deregulation in the
telecommunications industry. Specifically, Mosco addresses five myths of deregulation:
21

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Deregulation
Deregulation
Deregulation
Deregulation
Deregulation

lessens the economic role of government.
benefits consumers.
diminishes economic concentration.
is widely supported.
is inevitable (Mosco, 1990, p.37).

Although this work was completed in 1990 before the 1996 Telecommunications Act,
the logic of deregulation, which commenced from Reagan administration, can be
discerned in Mosco's (1990) analysis. By addressing the myths, Mosco (1990) reveals the
misleading implications, challenging the notion that government non-intervention can be
good for the public and efficient and neoliberal market competitions would take good care
of people's needs with lower costs.
McChesney (1997) contends the current corporate media is sheltered by several
powerful myths that impede media reform.
These myths include: that an advertising-supported, profit-driven media system was
ordained by the Founding Fathers and the First Amendment; That professionalism in
journalism will protect the public interest from private media control; that the Internet and
new digital technologies with their billions of potential channels eliminate any reason to be
concerned about corporate domination of media; that the market is the best possible
organization for a media system because it forces media firms to "give the people what they
want"; that a commercial media system was selected historically in public debate as the best
possible system for a democracy, and the matter has therefore been determined for all time;
and that the media are not dominated by corporate interests but, instead, have a liberal or
left-wing anti-business bias (McChesney, 1997, p.8).

Clearly, some dominant myths about both deregulation and the American corporate
media system buttress free market notions and neoliberalism by mythologizing that media
functions best in a free market environment. In China, dominant myths such as "socialism
with Chinese characteristics" disguise China's capitalist and neoliberal operations in all
aspects of China.
3.6 Neoliberalism proliferates
Neoliberalism is a very significant concept for my research in that my thesis intends
to argue that neoliberalism, which typically represents capitalist logic, is now saturated
and pervasive in the Chinese communication system.
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Harvey (2005) defines neoliberalism as "a theory of political economic practices that
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by
strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade" (p.2). A according to the
theory, government intervention must be kept to a bare minimum, and a free market can
maximize the social good.
Neoliberalism can date back to the early 1980s, when Margaret Thatcher and Ronald
Reagan came into power (Horwitz, 2005; Hartwick and Peet, 2003). Margaret Thatcher
managed to curb trade union power and cease the miserable inflationary stagnation of
Britain. Across the Atlantic, Ronald Reagan, along with Paul Volcker, former Chairman of
Federal Reserve, revitalized the U.S. economy by deregulating industries and liberating
the powers of finance. Neoliberalism then became a doctrine and was transformed into
the "central guiding principle of economic thought and management" (Harvey, 1995, p. 2).
Neoliberal ideology became hegemonic not only among Republicans but also in the
Democratic Party, both of which agreed that free market was the rightful ruler over
society (McChesney, 2004b, pp.49, 50).
Neoliberalism has always been rendered as an infallible and perfect theory or method
to regulate media. The media industry argues free market competition can satisfy the
public interest and regulation of media "violated the free press and free speech clauses of
the First Amendment" (McChesney, 2004b, p.50). As Hartwick and Peet (2003) note,
neoliberalism views markets as "optimally efficient means of organizing economies"
(p. 189). Any form of interference, which would disturb fair and free market competition,
is thus inappropriate and unacceptable. McChesney (2004a) adds the ideology of
neoliberalism is "the notion of the competitive media market 'giving the people what they
23

want'" and that "the market can do no wrong" (p45). Therefore, neoliberalism in the field
of communication has been mythologized as a guideline or standard for fair competition,
small government, free press, free speech and, of course, democracy. Harvey (2005)
suggests neoliberalism is as distorted as a "freedom" that all of us want and cherish. It
seems that neoliberalism has been closely associated with individualism and freedom
since it was born. It is worth noting that in this framework, neoliberalism equals the
"freedom" which allows corporate giants to dominate the business world and neglect the
common interest. Also, neoliberalism has nothing to do with individualism. "The idea that
the market is the best and most rational manner to regulate affairs is the philosophical
justification for the wave of deregulation, privatization, and commercialization that has
swept U.S. and global media and communication system" (McChesney, 2004 a, p.45).
Also, as Harvey (2005, p.3) says, neoliberalism has become the hegemonic discourse
"incorporated into the common-sense way many of us interpret, live in, and understand
the world".
The triumphs of dominant myths, neoliberalism and deregulation have accelerated
the concentration of media ownership. A few media groups now control most media
outlets and promote their business interests and agendas. Instead of serving democratic
purposes of informing the public, offering diverse voices, and encouraging grassroots
participation, corporate media work to "advance the interests of the wealthy few"
(McChesney & Nichols, 2002, p.47).
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Chapter 4: China's Media: History and Context
China, the world's most populous and largest developing country with more than
5000 years history, possesses distinct culture, economy, history, ideology and politics.
Research on the current Chinese media environment should be set in historical, cultural,
social and, of course, political economic contexts.
Although both Mosco (1996) and Garnham (1990) particularly stress that political
economy of communication is primarily used to analyze capitalist societies and
commercial media systems, a lot of Chinese and overseas scholars, such as Yuezhi Zhao
(et al. 1998, 2000, 2005), Chin-Chuan Lee (2000), Zhou He (2000), and Stanley Rosen
etc, have been using a political economy theoretical framework to illuminate their
research on socialist Chinese media. In their works, I do not find an adequate
rationalization for applying the theory of political economy of communication to a
socialist communication system. I will also use political economy of communication to
investigate socialist Chinese communication system, but will also try to present better
rationales for this application. They are: 1) The interactive impact of politics and
economics on media structure, content and operation, and the manifestations of power
relations, which are the main concerns of political economy of communication, can be
clearly discerned in the today's Chinese communication system. 2) To some extent, the
current socialist Chinese media are employing capitalist operations, and most of the
money comes from market operations such as advertising, sponsorship and other
promotional activities, although a few media entities are still partially subsidized by the
government. 3) Although the Chinese government controls ownership and exercises full
editorial control, it always greenlights or even supports a market orientation, by which I
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mean the capitalist neoliberal free market and hyper-commercialism. Of course all these
are based on the premise that there are no anti-communist and anti-socialist connotations
in the commercial activities and media content. 4) Putting aside the government's
censorship and involvement in some media content, the current media industry is
commercially operated in almost the same way as its Western counterpart.
4.1 The Transformation- New China's Communication System, yesterday and today
My research commences from the idea that the American capitalist communication
system is not alone in its use of the neoliberal free market ideology to commodity "the
culture industry" (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1977) and to maximize its profits. Like their
American counterpart, Chinese media also promote commercialism and globalization,
boost neoliberalism and market economics, and serve the ends of dominant power. My
central hypothesis is that government ownership and editorial control and the market
economy with "Chinese characteristics", along with WTO membership and new media
technologies result in a Chinese media system characterized by a contradictory mix of
capitalist neoliberalism and socialist ideological indoctrination.
A number of scholars have addressed the contradictions of the current Chinese media
environment. Zhou He (2000), after investigating the newspaper Shenzhen Special Zone
Daily, calls this tension a "tug-of-war." Stanley Rosen (2000) characterizes it as a
"duality", by which he means includes both Chinese authoritarian control and a
capitalist-market system. Bin Zhao (1999) views it as "a double life." Harvey (2005)
names it as neoliberalism with authoritarian centralized control. Significantly, Harvey
(2005) provides a definition of "socialist with Chinese characteristics" by which he means
"capitalist dynamism" in a socialist society and Zhao (1998) generalizes it as "economic
liberation without political democratization" (p. 3). Other scholars also focus their studies
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on this special media phenomenon in China. Most of their conclusions were reached by
examining one single industry such as the print media or television. In my thesis, I try to
use political economy of communication as theoretic framework to figure out a more
general media landscape which involves broadcasting, press and new media.
4.2 Mao Zedong's Era (1949-1976)-Media of Soviet Communist Model
The relationship between media practices and sociopolitical structures has been well
documented since 1949, when new China was established. Mao Zedong, one of the
founders of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the first Chairman of new China,
governed China from 1949 to 1976. It was Mao who launched Cultural Revolution, a
social, political and economic chaos which persecuted millions of intellectuals and lasted
ten years from 1966 to 1976, namely to eradicate all capitalist elements in the brand new
republic and actually to undergird his political power. During these ten years the economy
was stagnant and even retreated due to a prioritized political agenda. Mao claimed four
tasks for the new Chinese media: to propagate the policies of the Communist Party, to
organize the masses, to educate the masses, and to mobilize the masses (Bishop, 1989).
Mao (1961) emphasized the principle of top-down communication between the party and
people: "the role and power of newspapers consists in their ability to bring the CPC
program, the CPC line, CPC general and specific policies, its tasks and methods of work
before the people in the quickest and most extensive way" (p.241). The media at that time
was the ultimate apparatus for the party to realize and strengthen its governance.
The media practices of Mao's China can be put in Schramm's Soviet model or
"Soviet Communist Theory of the Press" because, as Bishop (1989, p.92) notes, "[i]n
many ways the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) has imitated the Soviet Union, including
its system of communication". After critically analyzing the Marxist basis of the Soviet
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idea, Schramm (1978, pi 10) points out that "the Marxist concept of unity and the sharp
distinction between right and wrong positions, would not permit the press to function as a
Fourth Estate, independently criticizing government or serving as a forum for free
discussion". Rather, the Communist press is "an instrument to interpret the doctrine, to
carry out the policies of the working class or the militant party" (Schramm, 1978, p. 110).
The Soviet communication system had only "a single purpose", that is, to serve the party
and state. In the same way, Bishop (1989) suggests, "[t]he main purpose of [Chinese]
communication- indeed, of life itself- is to build up the socialist state" (p.92).
During first years of new China, the CPC's main job was to quickly set up the
government's authority and to establish new political attitudes by utilizing radio,
newspapers, books and films (Bishop, 1989). Newspapers were used to transmit Party
instructions and "published both self-criticism and concrete criticism of local Party
activities", while most books published in this period focused on ideology, world
communism, and mass campaigns (Bishop, 1989, p. 66).
After the Korean War (1955-1958) was over, the function of media was switched
from agitation to mass education because Communist authority had been firmly
established (Bishop, 1989). Economic successes were stressed in the media in an effort to
demonstrate that "any gains in production stemmed from Communist ideology" (Bishop,
1989, p.68).
During the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960), an unrealistic economic ambition
aimed at making China a major industrial power overnight, wired radio systems,
newspapers, books, and films were thoroughly mobilized to promote the political
campaign.
During the period of Cultural Revolution, radio was used for airing revolutionary
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songs and for live broadcasts of mass rallies (Chu, 1994). Local stations would routinely
rebroadcast programs from Beijing concerning how the Chinese people could learn
Chairman Mao's work. Newspapers often echoed papers published by the army and films
were confined to newsreels and documentaries about the army (Bishop, 1989). As Bishop
(1989, p.75) puts it, "[the] Cultural Revolution broadcasting became extremely
propagandist^, strident, and chauvinistic [...]".
Therefore, in the Mao's era, mass media were deeply incorporated into the wider
political system and became an integral part of the ideological apparatus to best serve the
state's political need (Liu, 1971). The communication system at that time was used by
Chinese authorities as a total mouthpiece and propaganda machine to fulfill full-scale
ideological indoctrination.
4.3 Changing to a Paradoxically Mixed Mediascape
In the late 1970s, Mao's successor, Deng Xiaoping, one of the most respected senior
leaders among the Chinese people, initiated an "opening up" policy and economic
reforms. Briefly, the result of the reforms "has been the construction of a particular kind
of market economy that increasingly incorporates neoliberal elements interdigitated with
authoritarian centralized control." (Harvey, 2005, p. 120)
Deng, who seriously suffered during the turmoil of Cultural Revolution,
systematically criticized the ultra-leftist ideology and wrongdoings of Mao and made a
strategic decision to concentrate on economic development at the Third Plenary Session
of the Eleventh Communist Party Central Committee in December 1978. The slogan
"take class struggle as the key link" was discarded, and socialist modernization became
the first priority of new China. This Session is considered a turning point in contemporary
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Chinese history, prospectively ushering a new era in all aspects of China.
Deng (1982)'s notion of "socialism with Chinese characteristics", which was first
brought forward in his speech at the twelfth national congress of the CPC in 1982,
became one of the guidelines for the party to operate the nation. Deng emphasized that
the 1980s would be an important decade in the history of the party and the State. Deng
(1982) announced three tasks for the decade: to accelerate socialist modernization, to
strive for China's reunification and particularly for the return of Taiwan to the motherland,
and to oppose hegemonism and work to safeguard world peace, stressing that "economic
development is at the core of these tasks". The speech was a milestone for the party to
build "socialism with Chinese characteristics", the term which I argue is a "myth" for the
party to rationalize capitalist neoliberal free market operations in most sectors across the
country. From then, Chinese media became open to capital and the logic of market, also
in the name of "socialism with Chinese characteristics".
4.4 Capitalist Neoliberalism Trajectory
The economic reforms brought market forces into the Chinese economy to stimulate
competition among formerly state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which "dominated the
leading sector of the economy" (Harvey, 2005, p. 125). Private companies were
established to compete with SOEs to seek innovation and growth of the economy. In
addition, the opening-up policy, which ended China's isolation from the world economy,
greatly encouraged foreign investment. Agendas, such as "to realize Xiaokang society", a
moderately prosperous society that offers well-being life for all Chinese people, and "to
realize four modernizations", which are industry, agriculture, national defense, and
education, became the top priority of Deng's administration. In general, the economic
reforms have resulted in remarkable economic growth and have raised the living
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standards of twenty percent of world's population for 30 consecutive years. However,
economic reforms can never just transform an economy without altering its class relations,
institutional arrangements and operational mechanisms (Harvey, 2005). Rather, the
reforms had a tremendous influence on the political economy of industry, agriculture,
finance and, of course, the communication system.
Under this circumstance, Chinese media have experienced a significant
transformation and now operate along capitalist neoliberal logic. First and foremost,
Chinese media witnessed very rapid expansion during 1980s. Chang (1989, p.ix) cites a
set of statistics: a newspaper was founded every 36 hours in China in the 1980s, bringing
the number of newspapers from 1240 to 2191; "[t]he total newspaper circulation exceed
200 million in 1985", increasing 200 percent over 1978. Further evidence of rapid growth
in media can also be seen in statistics about the broadcasting system:
By 1984 China had 161 broadcasting stations that were on the air a total of 2767 hours
a day. The country also had 595 radio transmission or relay stations and 104 television
stations. There were 466 television transmission or relay stations with power exceeding one
kilowatt. The China Central Station aired 454 TV dramas in 1984.
The Chinese media in 1983 had 259,940 employees. Among them 48,531 were
reporters, editors, anchor persons, and translators [ . . . ] ( C h a n g , 1 9 8 9 , p . ix, p . x )

Importantly, the functions of Chinese media and its operational logic saw a
fundamental transformation. Robinson (1981) points out that the functions of media
"have been expanded to include advertising, entertainment, and coverage of news which
is decidedly more Western in approach" (p.58). She continues, stating that the changes
"are in response to and reinforce new economic and political priorities" (p. 58). Chang
(1989) also stresses that the role that Chinese media play has experienced "a marked
change" and is not just "the mouthpiece of the party" anymore (p. x).
As the economic reforms and opening-up policy deepened, enormous changes in all
sectors have swept across the nation moving steadfastly away from the near total
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politicization and regimentation that characterized Mao's era (Chu, 1994). Especially
since 1989, the party has accelerated market reforms in part to save itself from the brink
of a legitimacy crisis following the Tiananmen crackdown (Lee, 1994), and the substance
and dynamics of domestic politics have changed significantly (Zhao, 2005).
In early 1992, after visiting the city of Shenzhen, which used to be a fishing village
and was singled out to be the first special economic zone (SEZ) of China, Deng Xiaoping,
who was deeply impressed by the economic achievements of the SEZ, called to "be
bolder than before in conducting reform and opening to the outside and have the courage
to experiment" (Deng's speech, 1992). Reforms across all sectors have since been raised
to an unprecedented level. Deng's encouragement for further reform and opening in 1992
ushered in a comprehensive commercialization of the Chinese news media (Huang, 2003;
Pan, 2000).
The State General Publishing Administration under the governance of the party
Central Committee's Propaganda Department oversees the print media. The Chinese press
for many years was government financed and its production and distribution were
centrally planned by the government, however, the economic reforms spurred a press
boom and resulted in the formation of a market- oriented and financially independent
press. Meanwhile, the party actively pushed the press to the market with the
diminishment of direct subsidies and the creation of "encouraging" mechanisms such as
performance-related bonus, operational freedom and tax breaks (Zhao, 2000). In other
words, the party turned "media outlets into public units under business management", and
media organizations would get a "limited amount of state support for infrastructural
investment" and be "responsible for additional financial resources needed for their normal
operations" (Pan, 2000). Many newly established news outlets were market-oriented or
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reader-oriented (Huang, 2003; Pan, 2000), and even some traditional party newspapers
have increased their coverage of entertainment to attract commercial advertisements
(Huang, 2003). "A market-driven distribution" emerged (Pan, 2000, p.73), and some local
papers, such as Beijing Youth Daily, Yangcheng Evening News, and Southern Weekend,
competed for the nationwide market share and became influential across the country.
Advertising revenues for the newspapers reached 3.77 billion Yuan (Chinese currency) by
the end of 1993, four times of the figure in 1991, and advertising industry revenues grew
from 234 million Yuan to 13.4 billion Yuan between 1985 and 1995 (Pan, 2000). In the
earlier 1990s, China had over 3000 advertising entities and almost all the top advertising
agencies established branches in China (Pan, 2000). As a result, the term "marketization
of media industry" began to appear in the official vocabulary of journalism reforms (Pan,
2000).

Changes in the broadcasting industry, which is under supervision of State
Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT), are never inconspicuous. In the
late 1980s, the party first permitted broadcasting media to rely on multiple forms of
financing including advertising, sponsorship, and other forms of financing to supplement
the government subsidy, which had become a burden to the party (Yin, 2006). The
Chinese TV industry started from China Central Television (CCTV), which was
established in 1956 as Beijing Television. Television has seen speedy development since
then. In 2001, 1293 TV stations, 1272 of which were rural TV stations, were established
to operate 1206 channels across China, covering 93.65 percent of whole population
(Pavlik, 2002). The average growth rate of commercial income of Chinese radio,
television and film industry from 1993 to 2003 was 23%, much higher than the GDP
(SARFT, 2003).
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Meanwhile, the marketization and commercialization of the Chinese television have
had encouraged more flexibility and innovation in its programs in an effort to generate
more advertising revenue. All kinds of programming, including soap operas, fashion
shows, talk shows, popular music, dating programs, documentaries, cartoons, sports and
reality shows etc, flourish on different TV channels. Advertising has become the most
important revenue since its re-introduction in 1979 (Zhao, 2000; Yin, 2006). In the ever
competitive media industry, the masses which were to be educated and mobilized (Bishop,
1989) "have become the audiences to be pleased" (Zhao, 1999).
Many independent TV shopping companies or direct retail television companies
affiliated with TV networks have sprung up and established sales networks in major cities
across China (Zhao, 1999). Commercials, which overtly promote the spirit of
consumerism, have appeared everywhere in and between programs and become much
more frequent and lengthy. Jobs in the media section have become among the best paid
and most sought, and the television industry in particular is viewed as a rich institution
(Zhao, 1999). The economic reforms were credited for unleashing a bonanza of Chinese
media and the whole communication system is now on the way to becoming a highly
commercial and neoliberal capitalist system.
In the 21st century, the booming economy motivated the government to further
deepen its economic reform across all the sectors. As Chinese President Hu Jintao said in
his opening remarks at the Seventeenth National People's Congress held in October 2007,
Facts have incontrovertibly proved that the decision to begin reform and opening up is vital
to the destiny of contemporary China, that reform and opening up are the only way of
developing socialism with Chinese characteristics and rejuvenating the Chinese nation, that
only socialism can save China and that only reform and opening up can develop China,
socialism and Marxism[...] To sum up, the fundamental reason behind all our achievements
and progress since the reform and opening up policy was introduced is that we have blazed a
path of socialism with Chinese characteristics and established a system of theories of
socialism with Chinese characteristics. Essentially, to hold high the great banner of socialism
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with Chinese characteristics means to keep to this path and uphold this system (Hu, 2007).

To paraphrase Harvey (2005), the reforms and opening up, which are portrayed as the
"only" way to "develop China" by President Hu Jintao, have resulted in social inequality,
shift in class relations, and eventually something that looks like the reconstruction of
capitalist class power.
Media organizations were voluntarily engaged in or forced into marketization (He,
2000). Even some of the very important party mouthpieces such as People's Daily,
Xinhua News Agency and China Central Television have realized financial
self-sufficiency through all forms of commercialization. Another important fact, which
should not be neglected, is that the Chinese government uses authoritarian sponsorships,
such as mandatory subscriptions, exclusive news outlets or special funding to help media
organizations such as CCTV, Xinhua News Agency, People's Daily and China National
Radio (CNR) etc. to become media giants which enjoy oligopoly or monopoly advantages.
Meanwhile, these media empires also orient their production to market conditions, that is
to say, powerful media organizations exert their efforts to cater to advertisers and sell
their audiences to advertisers. As Zhao (2005) generalizes, "accelerated
commercialization and state-engineered market consolidation have transformed
state-subsidized and single minded propaganda organs into state-controlled,
advertising-supported, and self-interested economic entities" (p.66).
The Chinese version of American Idol, Super Voice Girls, an annual national singing
contest reality show organized by Hunan Satellite Television (one of the many provincial
broadcasters with national cable distribution) between 2004 and 2006, is claimed to be the
most "successful" Chinese TV show in history in terms of commercialization. The show
covered both awful and funny performances in earlier rounds and eager fan clubs in later
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rounds. It began with regional competitions in some big cities across China to reach as
many as possible contestants. The contest shows used the concept of "PK" (short for
"Player Kill"), vocabulary from Chinese video games, to create dramatic tension and
sensations among both contestants and audiences. Contestants who won on the PK stage
would enter into the next round, and "PK" has become fad word among young Chinese
since then.
Super Voice Girls of 2005 was so popular and commercially successful that CCTV
produced an analytical report on the show. According to the data of the report, the sponsor,
Mengniu Dairy, an inner Mongolia-based diary company, spent 280 million Yuan to
market its new sour yogurt drink, Suan Suan Ru, and the show was formally called
Mengniu Suan Suan Ru Super Voice Girls', the price for a 15-second advertising in the
final episode is 112,000 Yuan, which exceeded for the first time prime time advertising on
CCTV; the total advertising revenue of the show might reach 100 million Yuan. In
addition, the show had garnered a 300 million strong audience and for the first time
"topped the highest record created by CCTV's annual Spring Festival programs" (Chang,
2007, p.7); "more than 8 million Chinese paid about 20, a sizable amount in local terms,
to send a text message by mobile phone in support of one of the three Super Girl finalists"
(Madden & Wentz, 2005, p.22), bringing over 30 million Yuan revenue to Hunan Satellite
Television (Chang, 2007). As a result, Hunan Satellite Television, advertisers,
telecommunication firms, and involved institutions, such as advertising agencies and
recording companies which signed contracts with finalists, all gained considerable
revenue. Hunan Satellite Television commodified every aspect of the show and even
signed recording contracts with finalists to sell them to the recording companies. Super
Voice Girls, the highly commercialized entertainment show, well demonstrates the
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overwhelmingly neoliberal and commercial capitalist nature of media operations in
China.
Advertisers are also deeply involved in the news editorial process and advertorials
are pervasive. All kinds of awards and events are largely commercialized, and some
awards are directly issued to sponsors or advertisers which spend the most money to
sponsor the events. For a specific media company, it's never easy to find any negative
reporting on advertisers with which it has a business relationship. For example, in 2005
Communications Weekly, a leading newspaper focusing on telecommunication industry,
fired a journalist who wrote a negative article about Zhong Xing, the big advertiser of the
paper. Professional ethics have also been seriously eroded by commercialism and
neoliberalism. Journalists have even been found to accept "red packages" (literally a red
envelop with bribery money in it), solicit bribes, trade news space for personal benefits
and generate paid news. All kinds of product placement advertisements fill sitcoms,
dramas, and movies. Advertising is intruding on what was previously "untainted"
programming, including the scripts of movies, talk shows, and comedy skits.
In a word, the comprehensive changes in the Chinese media, initiated by the reform
and strengthened by the market competition, have given rise to a myriad neoliberal
practices in both content and form.
4.5 Transfiguring the WTO and Globalization in the Chinese media
The World Trade Organization (WTO), a successive organization of the General
Agreement of Trade and Tariff (GATT), was founded in 1995 as a result of eight years of
negotiations during the Uruguay Round (Ghafele, 2004). Designed to liberalize
international trade and lifting trade barriers among nations, the World Trade Organization
(WTO) provides a legal and institutional framework for all its member nations. At its core,
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the WTO believes that free trade is essential to global prosperity, economic growth and
better living standards (Ghafele, 2004).
Herman and McChesney (1997) argue that there is an intimate and mutually
constituted relationship between free trade organizations, consumerism and neoliberal
elite-serving capitalism. On one hand, The WTO reinforces many aspects of neoliberal
agenda, because capital can behave independently of its original nation and navigate
freely on the world stage. Briefly, money can be more easily made in the global market
under the protection of the WTO. As a result, power is concentrated in the hands of highly
profitable and wealthy multinational corporations. On the other hand, neoliberalism
rationalizes the operation of the WTO, because they share the same core of logic: free
trade.
In 2001, after striving unsuccessfully for 15 years, China officially gained entry into
the World Trade Organization. Chinese media positively rendered the WTO as both the
only viable path to prosperity and a symbol of a national pride (Yin, 2006), stating China
needed to enhance its market economy to better prepare its enterprises for the more fierce
competition from the overseas companies. Analyzing mainstream Chinese media
discourse on China's WTO entry, Zhao (2003) says press coverage conceals crucial
information about some issues to avoid domestic criticism of party's policies. Different
Chinese media outlets serve as a "cheerleader for China's WTO membership", and never
mentioned "the potential negative impact" of "the WTO membership for China's workers
and farmers" (Zhao, 2007, p. 202).
Globalization is a very important theory because of its dual meaning in academic
discourse: a descriptive term addressing the changes in the world and, more importantly,
"a theory or explanation of the changing character of the modern world" (Ampuja, 2004,
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p.64). Giddens (1999) suggests that globalization is more than an economic phenomenon
which encourages the proliferation of the free market. To paraphrase Ampuja (2004), the
noteworthy thing about globalization is its inclusiveness, which describes not only
economic phenomena but also new array of political, social, cultural and technological
processes. From a more general perspective, globalization reflects complicated social
change. As far as my thesis topic is concerned, I attempt to look at globalization from a
somewhat narrower economic perspective and examine how the Chinese media are
describing and are affected by globalization. Ohiorhenuan (2000, p.56), defines
globalization as "the broadening and deepening of national economies into a worldwide
market for goods, services and capital" (as cited in Ghafele, 2004).
Globalization is a buzz-word winning universal applause in Chinese media, which
uses globalization to explicate and rationalize the nationwide capitalistic proliferation and
renders both globalization and the WTO as bringing economic prosperity and cultural
harmony on a global scale. Chinese media connects globalization with the local
companies' expansion of the market share in the global market, hailing the success of
some corporations such as Lenovo, Zhong Xing, Huawei (the names of the big Chinese
companies) for their global operations. These images of globalization in China signify
both the desire for consumerism and the anxiety of the Chinese for modernity (Xie, 2008).
As Ghafele (2004, p.442) points out, globalization is "a human artifact that is being
positioned as a natural phenomenon" and results from "human views, beliefs and politics".
In essence, globalization results in a worldwide capitalistic system that propels and values
the interests of powerful corporations (Ampuja, 2004).
As McChesney (1998) puts it, the global reach of market economics and international
trade cannot be realized if there are no global media conglomerates functioning as "the
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new missionaries of global capitalism" (p.2). In the same way, Ampuja (2004, p.65)
suggests that "media plays a vital, even constitutive role in globalisation debates". The
Chinese media, like the capitalistic global media giants, promote neoliberal ideology,
commercialism and capitalism by transfiguring the WTO and globalization. Therefore,
under the "aura" of the WTO framework and globalization, the Chinese media skillfully
rationalize not only the nationwide capitalization and commercialization, but also its own
capitalistic operations.
4.6 Chinese New Media- A Potential Way Out?
New media, which Scatamburlo-D'Annibale and Boin (2007) define as the
"communicative forms that are interactive, digital, Internet-related" (p.236), also
contribute to the complicated transformation of the Chinese mediascape. With quick
development of the information and communication technologies in China, Chinese
people are becoming "wired" at an expeditious rate. By the end of 2008, the number of
China's Internet users reached 298 million and the penetration grew to 22.6 percent,
which surpassed the global average of 21.9 percent (MIIT, 2009), making China the
largest internet-user market in the world.
Some believe that the democratic potential new media could bring to Chinese society
has already taken shape. However, others are not as enthusiastic and optimistic toward the
new mediascape of China. Arguably, Chinese new media also embrace neoliberalism and
favor elite social powers.
Vincent Mosco (2004a) directly connects digitization and commodification with a
political economy perspective, claiming that digitization coincides with the process of
commodification or the transformation of use value into exchange value. Digitization "is
used first and foremost to expand the commodification of information and entertainment
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content, enlarge markets in the audiences that take in and make use of digitized
communication, and deepen the commodification of labor involved in the production,
distribution and exchange of communication" (Mosco, 2004a, p. 156). Also, as
Scatamburlo-D'Annibale and Boin (2007) point out, new media developments tend "to be
dominated by business interests that maximized their potential as media of industry,
commerce, and economic accumulation and exploitation" (p.235).
By 2007, the market value of the new media industry in China was 114 billion Yuan,
and the gross revenue from "commodified" internet media such as advertisements, video,
games, and downloading businesses reached 25.2 billion Yuan (SinoCast, 2008). Aiming
at expanding their media empires and maximizing their business interests for the "new
media cake", Chinese state-owned "traditional" media, like their American counterparts,
drew on the framework of spatialization and the logic of synergy to navigate the new
media environment. For example, CCTV and China Mobile and China Unicom, China's
two largest telecommunication operators, joined hands to launch a mobile TV business in
2007. At the same time, CCTV made every effort to convert to digital broadcasting
television to expand the means of revenue-making. Interactive digital pay television
services provide a wide range of digital channels such as classified advertising, stock
market information, health, entertainment, and home shopping etc. Also like the Western
media behemoths, CCTV employs more "efficient" forms of commodificationrecirculation, repackaging, revisioning, recycling and redeployment- to fatten its profit
margins. Therefore, content in new media outlets very much repeats the "same old stuff'
(Meehan, 2007, p. 25).
Zhao (2007) argues that China's information revolution is impelled by not only by
state-controlled and market-driven forces but also "the convergent interests of domestic
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bureaucratic" and "international corporate capital" (p. 190). In addition, China's Internet
users are disproportionately concentrated in the wealthy urban class, and the digital divide
also can be seen across social segments of the society such as the educated rather than the
illiterate and the young rather than the old etc. New media and information development
have empowered "super-wired" elites rather than the majority of the public (Zhao, 2007).
Moreover, Chinese internet users are blocked from retrieving certain sensitive
information because the proxy server filters certain combinations of phrasings and words
such as civil rights and democracy etc. Human censors also actively block politically
objectionable content from reaching netizens in China. Therefore, it is impossible for the
new media to fully realize its democratic potentials or to serve as a healthier public sphere
in China.
4.7 Ideological Control of New China
The central argument of the thesis is that the current Chinese media is living a
"double life" (Zhao, 1999): capitalist neoliberal operation and socialist ideology control.
In this section, I will spotlight the apparatus of ideological indoctrination of the Chinese
media. To paraphrase Lee (1994), no communication systems are totally free from control,
but the causes and consequences of control differ significantly. In the post-Mao era,
although the state had loosened a little bit its rigid command system, Deng never
hesitated to smash any challenges against communist party and socialist society (Sun,
Chang, and Yu, 2001).
Mass media are bureaucratic and coercive apparatuses for the Communist Party and
the party firmly controls and manipulates the Chinese communication system. Chinese
media, along with the Communist Party, represent how the "upper hand" uses the
propaganda machine to help maintain political control. Zhao (2005) argues that "the party
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state continues to exercise tight political control of the media. The tens of thousands of
worker and farmer protests, many of them large in scale and involving violent
confrontations with state authorities, for example, simply do not happen as far as Chinese
media are concerned" (p. 65). The CPC is concurrently the owner, the manager, and, to
some extent, the practitioner of the Chinese communication system, which is staffed by
loyal party members (Chu, 1994).
The Communist Party has never doubted that media could "manufacture consent"
(Herman and Chomsky, 1988), produce ruling ideology and hegemony, and strengthen
governance, thus, the party has always maintained a tight grip over the "ideological state
apparatuses" (Althusser, 1971) to maintain a favorable atmosphere for governance. Gilley
(2001) describes the party as "moving to reposition itself as a de facto right-wing
dictatorship" (as cited in Zhao, 2005), realizing that capitalist commercialism and
neoliberalism are potentially detrimental to the rationality of socialism, the party strives
to reinforce the supremacy of its ruling ideology.
I argue that the party uses at least three methods to enhance the socialist ideology.
First, the party reiterates and mythologizes the slogan "socialism with Chinese
characteristics". This slogan, which was first brought up by Deng Xiaoping who also
invented the notion of "one country, two systems", has become the dominant discourse or
myth. For over two decades, this discourse has been repeatedly used by both the Chinese
government and media to rationalize the widespread capitalist operations in socialist
China. Second, Chinese media, under the direct control by the party, overwhelmingly
foreground and emphasize the achievements, contributions, and economic and social
developments that CPC has made. Third, the party skillfully manipulates the people's
nationalism and associates it with socialism.
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Decades ago, ideological indoctrination appeared to be entirely explicit. Ideological
control in China reached "an absurd level", and "anyone who dared to express ideas even
minimally different from Mao Zedong's was condemned as a 'class enemy'" (Su, 1994,
p.75). As Zhao (2005) notes, the party cast itself as the "self-righteous impulse of
maintaining ideological purity" and the "self-proclaimed status as monopoly holder of
truth" (p.65). For instance, students had to learn the "revolution" songs, such as
"Socialism Is Good'' and " Without the Communist Party There Would Be No New China"
etc, and had to sing these songs in all kinds of singing contests or ceremonies. Take
myself as an example, I could still sing those songs more than twenty years later after I
first learned them, not because I have good memory, but because I had to sing them
scores of times when I was a child. Compared to directly debunking or deprecating the
capitalist social system years ago, current Chinese media use more implicit tactics to
indoctrinate socialist ideology by singing high praise for the "socialism with Chinese
characteristics" and the party's achievements in various aspects. As a result, no
ideological debates on the nature of Deng's reforms and opening-up policy have occurred
in recent years, and the Chinese people tend to accept the reality of the capitalist
operations in the name of "socialism with Chinese characteristics".
The party, now under the supervision of the fourth President Hu Jingtao, further
firmly controls the operations of Chinese media by imposing serious censorship. Zhao
(2000) contends that the government keeps a firm hand on the central and provincial party
papers, which are mandated to spread its ideology and rely on the party's administrative
sanctions to secure office subscriptions.
For example, in January of 2006, the publication of Freezing Point, a four-page
weekly provocative and aggressive news and opinion supplement of the China Youth
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Daily, a daily official newspaper of the Communist Youth League, was suspended by
authorities. Party officials ordered Freezing Point to be shut down and condemned it for
an article that said the Chinese middle schools' history textbooks "soft-pedaled the
mistakes of Qing Dynasty leaders in the late 19th century" (Yardley, 2006). Propaganda
officials claimed that the article viciously attacked the socialism system. The chief editor,
Datong Li, and his deputy Yuegang Lu were demoted because of the incident. Earlier on,
Beijing News, a joint venture between the party organ paper Guangming Daily and the
Southern Daily newspaper group, boldly covered violent crackdowns on villagers who
protested against a construction of a power plant in Dingzhou, a city in Hebei province.
Local officials of Dingzhou reportedly hired thugs to thwart the protests and caused six
villagers to lose their lives. As a result, Bin Yang, the progressive editor-in-chief of the
paper, was fired without notice and any official explanation. According to the China Post
website, officials criticized the Beijing News and said it '"committed errors in the
orientation of opinion' and was a 'recidivist'".
In the broadcasting industry, the programming regulations are used to guide national
media and their contents, facilitating both content control and ideological control for the
party. SARFT commands local television stations (city level or country level stations) to
fully relay both CCTV programs and its commercials as well, stipulating that "the local
stations shall not switch off the commercials of CCTV; and shall not disturb the full
relaying programs either in the form of moving captions or others" (Guo, 2003, p.8). The
party controls both TV and radio. The headlines of prime time news programs are always
the activities of the party top leaders and big events of the party regardless of the program
ratings. The national live prime time CCTV news program Xinwen Lianbao, has been
mandated to be simultaneously aired on all the other provinces' satellite TV channels for
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decades. It is noteworthy that this news program is the ultimate "propaganda machine"
for socialist ideology. In addition, all the national and provincial broadcasters are
mandated to deliver live broadcasting on some key events, such as the National Congress
of the Communist Party of China (NCPCC), and are required to arrange special programs
to increase the scope of the coverage. Slogans which sing high praise for the Communist
Party can be heard and seen all the time across all the mainstream media platforms. Local
stations can only broadcast international news from the national media, and the relaying
of cross-border satellite programs is forbidden (Guo, 2003). China International
Television Corporation (CITC), a subsidiary of CCTV, is the only organization which has
the exclusive right to import the foreign films and television programs (Guo, 2003).
Individuals and institutions are prohibited from receiving foreign satellite programming,
and hotels rated three-star or above and some parts of Guangdong province are allowed to
get access to some foreign satellite channels under real time censorship.
To some extent, Chinese media workers might be the "best" practitioners in the world
in regard to the self-censorship. Any reporting of big events, serious domestic disasters,
sensitive topics or scandals of senior leaders must be under instruction of the Department
of Propaganda, Central Committee of the CPC or other party organs to frame the
reporting in correspondence with the dominant socialist powers and ideology. Pavlik
(2002) believes that these issues are too sensitive and that reporting on them may lead to
some negative perspectives on socialist ideology. Jiaodian Fangtan (Focus) is a very
influential daily investigative TV program of CCTV. Program topics are under scrutiny of
the Department of Propaganda. The proportion of negative reporting to positive reporting
is restricted. The program's critical reporting on public issues and even corruption has
helped to develop a sense of public opinion supervision and alleviate public anxieties
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(Zhao, 1999). Also, as Zhao (1999, p.259) puts it, "critical reporting is carefully
controlled to avoid fuelling social frustration and political upheaval". Instructions are
given to define the meaning of the events and to make sure whether it should have a
negative or positive propensity, how serious it should be and how deep it should be.
Criticisms are mainly confined to reveal "technical problems at the operational level"
(Zhao, 1999, p.259) rather the fundamental policies or ideologies of the party.

Chapter 5. Methodology: Critical Discourse Analysis
Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky (1988) note most societies no longer have to
rule by brute force but by "manufacturing consent" among the governed. By this, they
mean there is a more subtle, discursive and detrimental form of manipulation, which van
Dijk (2006, p.359) defines "as a form of social power abuse", "cognitive mind control"
and "illegitimate domination", reinforcing all kinds of stereotyped thinking, naturalizing
social inequality and power relations into a "common sense." More specifically, these
power abuses, inequalities and injustices are enacted, produced, sustained, naturalized and
legitimated by discourse (van Dijk, 1993). "Those who govern" have always been
manufacturing consent among "those who are governed" through dominant myths,
ideologies and discourses.
Myriad scholars, theorists and researchers in the field of communication inform and
employ Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to expose and challenge this political
manipulation and unequal social relations. At its core, CDA offers "special standing as
guides for human action" and aims at "producing enlightenment and emancipation"
(Wodak, 2003, p. 4). Blommaert & Bulcaen (2000) argues that CDA is one of the "most
influential and visible branches of discourse analysis" (p.447).
My investigation of the Chinese communication system will challenge its
contradictory mix of capitalist neoliberalism and socialist authoritarian ideological
indoctrination. I hypothesize that "socialism with Chinese characteristics" is one of the
biggest myths which have been used to legitimize and rationalize both neoliberal
operations and ideological manipulation. I have chosen Critical Discourse Analysis as my
research methodology to examine media discourse from a "social justice" perspective. I

48

believe that CDA is a very effective method to expose such myths, social injustices, and
hidden power relations within the so-called "economic booming" and "peaceful and
prosperous" socialist society.
In order to generate a holistic picture of Critical Discourse Analysis, I believe it is
necessary to delineate CDA from a historical perspective, sketch its metatheoretical
positions and intellectual lineage, and draw on some forceful, transcendent, and
influential figures in this field such as Wodak, van Dijk, Fairclough, and Kress. In
addition, I try to provide an illustrative example to demonstrate how to use CDA. Some
of the strengths and limitations about this research tradition are also briefly discussed. I
conclude that CDA is a very effective method to investigate and challenge the hidden
power relations in contemporary society from a social justice perspective. More
specifically, CDA is an ideal fit for my research project which aims to examine media
discourse of socialist Chinese communication system.
5.1 About Critical Discourse Analysis
Many key scholars in the field of CDA define this theory and method. Wodak (2001,
2003) defines CDA as "fundamentally concerned with analyzing opaque as well as
transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as
manifested in language" (2001, p.4; 2003, p.2). Wodak (2003) also notes that "CDA aims
to investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, signaled, constituted,
legitimized and so on by language use (or in discourse)" (p.2). Kress (1996, p. 15) depicts
CDA as a "political project" which aims to alter "inequitable distributions of economic,
cultural and political goods" and "bring a system of excessive inequalities of power into
crisis by uncovering its workings and its effects through analysis of potent cultural
objects—texts—and thereby to help in achieving a more equitable social order" (cited by
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Hammersley, 1997). In very much the same way, van Dijk (1993) presents CDA as "the
study and critique of social inequality" (p.249) and contends that critical discourse
analysts "must be activists" (p.253). Fairclough (1995) declares that CDA strives to
challenge non-transparent power imbalances and social inequalities and to examine how
discursive practices and power are mutually constituted. Fairclough (1995) defines CDA
as follows:
[CDA] often [investigates] opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a)
discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and
processes; to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically
shaped by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these
relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power. (Fairclough 1995,
pp. 132-3).

Fairclough (2003) also regards CDA as reflecting "dialectical relationships between
semiosis (including language) and other elements of social practices" (p. 123). In addition,
Huckin (2001) depicts CDA as "a highly context-sensitive, democratic approach which
takes an ethical stance on social issues with the aim of improving society". Wickham &
Kendall (2007) contend that CDA, which emerged from other forms of discourse analysis
and conversation analysis, offers a commitment to demystifying dominant ideologies and
to serve to various forms of emancipation.
From the above definitions, we can state that CDA focuses on social and political
issues, chooses the perspective of those who suffer most (Wodak, 2003), challenges those
in power, and critically analyzes social injustices. Importantly, CDA reveals not just
unequal power relations, but also offers insights to emancipate and make change. As
Wodak (2003) points out, CDA sheds light on "human action".
Wodak (2003) offers a general account of the historical development of critical
discourse analysis. CDA developed in 1970s and 1980s at the University of East Anglia.
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"It follows on from the 'critical linguistics' of Fowler, Kress and others" (Hammersley,
1997). The founders of the research tradition claimed that discourses are ideological and
signs are not arbitrary. An interpretation or explanation of text was linked to a wide
variety of notions such as ideology, power, hierarchy and gender, and other sociological
variables. According to Wodak (2003), development of the CDA network was marked by
both a symposium which featured van Dijk, Fairclough, Kress, and Wodak etc in
Amsterdam in 199 land by a variety of works launched by these key researchers in late
1980s and early 1990s. Since then, annual symposia have taken place and indicate the
paradigm has been established, which binds together an international, heterogeneous
group of scholars, a research agenda and programme (Wodak, 2003).
In terms of its intellectual roots, CDA is an interdisciplinary domain of study that can
trace back to a variety of intellectual lineages. Obviously, CDA has roots in the discipline
of linguistics. It aims to investigate language use, text, talk, and, more abstractly,
discourse. But CDA is certainly not a comprehensive and analytic study of certain
language. In the context of the term Critical Discourse Analysis, language use is regarded
as a form of social practice instead of a purely individual activity (Flairclough, 1993).
Importantly, CDA also has intellectual lineage in the Frankfurt School (van Dijk,
1993; Wodak, 2003), with its emphasis on neo-Marxist critique. Bettig (2002) insists the
critical theory of the Frankfurt School "must serve the purposes of social change and not
simply describe the world 'as it is'" (p. 82). The "critical" perspective of CDA, which
Wodak describes as refusing to take things for granted, opening up complexity,
combating reductionism, being self-reflexive, and proposing alternatives, corresponds to
the "critical" commitment of Frankfurt School. CDA seeks social change, which is also
the legacy of the Frankfurt School.
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Another noteworthy line of influence is the one going back to Antonio Gramsci and
his followers, including most notably Stuart Hall and the other members of the Centre for
Contemporary Cultural Studies (van Dijk, 1993). CDA draws upon Gramsci's hegemony,
which concerns how the dominant class maintains political power and manufactures
"popular consent" by manipulating public opinion. Ideology, as Stuart Hall (1982)
defines it, concerns how power naturalizes certain meanings and produces
taken-for-granted views of the social world. Eagleton (1994) also points out that the study
of ideology is about examining the relation between thought and social reality (as cited in
Wodak, 2003). CDA challenges the discourses which are saturated with hegemony and
ideology that represent the entrenched values of the "bourgeoisie" and the power
structure of society.
Finally, one can easily identify the influence of work of Foucault on the pedigree of
CDA (van Dijk, 1993). As Fairclough (1993) describes, "Foucault has had a huge
influence upon the social sciences and humanities, and the popularization of the concept
of 'discourse' and of discourse analysis as a method can partly be attributed to that
influence" (p.37). Foucault contends that discourse produces knowledge and constructs
social subjects as "objects" and that a power struggle takes place both in and over
discourse (as cited in Fairclough, 1993). Although the definition of discourse that
Foucault offers, to some extent, differs from discourse of Critical Discourse Analysis, the
contributions of Foucault to CDA can easily be discerned.
CDA thus inherits multiple research traditions and draws on a variety of prestigious
scholars. Significantly, CDA's intellectual lineage employs a distinct "social justice"
perspective to seek emancipatory potentials to change the unequal status quo.
"All research methodologies rest on some ontological and epistemological
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foundation" (Strega, 2005, p.201). Therefore, in order to achieve a full understanding of
CDA, attention to its metatheoretical perspective should necessarily be paid.
Ontology concerns "the nature of social world and the people, group, and processes
that populate that world" (Miller, 1995, p. 26). It can also be understood as a world view.
CDA never appears to take the realist position, because a realist insists "both the physical
and the social world as consisting of structures that exist 'out there' and that are
independent of an individual's perception" (Miller, 1995, p. 27). CDA, with close
intellectual lineage to critical theories, disputes the realist claim. On the contrary, CDA
"assumes a social constructionist view of discourse" (Huckin, 2001) and believes that
social reality is constructed or constituted intersubjectively through interactive
communication.
In terms of epistemology, Miller (1995) says that it "involves ideas about what
knowledge is and how knowledge is created and represented in the social world" (p.30).
Put another way, "an epistemology is a philosophy of what counts as knowledge and
'truth'" (Strega, 2005, p.201). By no means do I believe that our knowledge about
discourse, ideology, and power relations can be objectively achieved. I believe that
knowledge "resides with social participants in specific situations and thus must be
garnered through experience or through extended interaction with insiders" (Miller, 1995,
p. 30). Therefore, CDA, which has strong commitment to challenge the dominant
ideology and discourses, takes the subjectivists' epistemological position. In addition,
Miller (1995) contends that the epistemological stance of the critical research tradition is
the critical-emancipatory cognitive interest of Habermas (1971), which regards
knowledge as "serving the interests of change and emancipation" (p.73).
Regarding axiology, which is "the study of values" (Miller, 1995, p. 30), I believe
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that personal and professional values are "a lens through which social phenomena are
observed" (Miller, 1995, p. 58). I insist that values are attached or stuck to the worldviews
and it is never possible to eliminate them from research. As Miller notes, "values should
guide scholarship" and researchers should "work as change agents in supporting those
values" (p.74). Taking the anti-status-quo stance by exposing alienating power relations,
CDA can never be value-free. I value a healthy communication system which elevates the
public interest, reflects the majority of public voices rather than voices of the few elites,
and cares more about the marginalized people instead of those in power. Guided by these
values, I intend to reveal the problematic political economy of Chinese media and offer an
alternative view for change.
To sum, CDA holds a social constructionist ontological stance, posits a
critical-emancipatory potential, and axiologically focuses its role in revealing unequal
power relations.
5.2 The Approaches of CDA- Methodological Framework
The objective of challenging unequal power relations through CDA necessarily
ushers researchers into the question of how best to go about doing so. There are no set or
fixed procedures for performing a CDA due to the distinct and specific nature of each
research project. There are definitely some general guidelines. Thomas Huckin (2001)
provides a very clear and detailed picture of how to use this methodology to carry out
research.
Huckin (2001) identifies two stages in analyzing a text. First, comprehend the text at
a manifest, uncritical level. Second, step back from the text and look at it critically for its
latent meaning. There are several steps in the second stage which enable a successful
CDA project. I then discuss them as follows.
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Genre is very important in CDA methodology. Genre manifests linguistic features of
a certain text or discourse. Determining the genre of a text allows CDA analysts to
understand "why certain kinds of statements appear in the text and how they might serve
the purposes of the text-producer" (Huckin, 2001). Genre also enables analysts to
critically detect deviations from a text.
Framing is of significance in CDA research because it determines "how the content
of a text is presented, what sort of perspective (angle, slant) the writer is taking" (Huckin,
2001). Some more specific tools related to framing should also be reviewed.
Foregrounding refers to the ways how the author emphasizes certain content, while
backgrounding means a process of de-emphasizing certain concepts or information.
Omission is an extreme form of backgrounding, which totally ignores or neglects certain
relevant issues. Omission can be ultimately ideologically potent, "because if the writer
does not mention something, it often does not even enter the reader's mind and thus is not
subjected to his or her scrutiny" (Huckin, 2001). Presupposition naturalizes and takes
certain ideas for granted without an alternative. Presupposition is often employed to
support ideology and unequal power relations.
Genre and framing allow CDA analysts to consider a text as a whole. But, researchers
need to proceed through the text in greater detail at the sentence level. Topicalization is a
type of foregrounding, which creates topic of a sentence and affects the reader's
perception. Agency can help readers discern certain people who exercise power and
initiate actions from others who are passively "recipients of those actions" (Huckin, 2001).
Another important tool worth attending is insinuations, which can be a strong element in
discourse due to their typical double meanings. Modality affects tone by choosing the
words or phrases of different degrees of certitude and authority such as "might", "must",
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or "it's possible that" (Huckin, 2001).
In order to give a clearer view of the practical application of CDA, I provide an
example to demonstrate how some of its relevant analytic tools have been used.
Phelan (2007) investigated the editorial discourse about Telecom Eireann's stock
market floatation in six Irish broadsheet newspapers. According to Phelan (2007), the
floatation of this telecommunication company was the biggest privatization in the history
of Ireland. Phelan's research is based on a sample of editorial columns of the six Irish
newspapers throughout 1999 and 2000 (before and after the company's floatation).
As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, there is no standardized or universal way to
utilize the tools of CDA. In this case, Phelan uses the three concepts or tools, which are
developed by Fairclough (2003), to perform his CDA analysis: genres, discourses ("ways
of representing"), and styles ("ways of being" or identification) (as cited in Phelan, 2007,
p.8).
By utilizing the framework and tools (such as framing) of CDA, Phelan (2007)
uncovers three discursive frames that have key neo-liberal assumptions. The first
discursive frame that Phelan (2007) uncovered is that the editorial treatment of the full
privatization is depicted as desirable and preferable. For instance, one of the columns
describes that "[in] the bad old days, [the country] was forced to live with very high
prices from a communications monopoly", and another editorial reports that Telecom
Eireann will "face the full rigour of fair competition [after full privatization]" (cited by
Phelan, 2007, p. 13). The insinuation is that a liberalized telecommunication market
symbolizes a more professional operation, equal competition and high efficiency, while
government involvement is insinuated as undesirable. The second frame is that direct
state involvement in the telecommunication industry is archaic (Phelan, 2007). The third
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frame that Phelan (2007) discerned is that public participation in the stock market is a
wise choice and should be encouraged. One of the editorials declares that "the
[investment] risk is almost non-existent... This floatation is surely on the way to success"
(cited by Phelan, 2007, p. 15). One report portrays the floatation as "an opportunity that
can be shared by all" (cited by Phelan, 2007, p. 15). Insinuated throughout the discourse is
that neo-liberalist telecommunication market benefits the public financially and people
should participate in the stock market.
By employing CDA, Phelan (2007) exposes the embedded neo-liberal ideology in the
discourse of Irish media. Phelan (2007) concludes that the neo-liberalism is clearly
embedded in the media discourse and the three discursive frames play an important role
in legitimizing, naturalizing, and projecting the authority of "order of discourse" of the
dominant power in Ireland (p.24).
5.3 The Strengths and Limitations of CDA
The interdisciplinary nature of CDA results in a number of strengths. There are two
particular merits I would like to highlight, which more or less relate to the definition of
CDA itself. First, with a commitment to social justice, CDA challenges power relations
from a distinct perspective or angle: discourse. In CDA, discourse is scrutinized as a site
of power and struggle (Wodak, 2003, p.6). The micro-level, specific and detailed
perspective of CDA can certainly lead to a more convincing argument and help build a
more effective "bottom-up" resistance. Second, rather than just revealing and exposing
unequal social relations and power abuses, CDA creates "awareness in agents of their
own needs and interest" and aims at "producing enlightenment and emancipation"
(Wodak, 2001, p. 4). This is quite significant, because CDA has the conscious intention
to serve the purpose of social change which possesses agency or power to alter the status
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quo. Third, CDA is a set of "handy" tools. Both its theoretical and methodological
perspectives are very straightforward.
However, CDA is not free from critique. As Wodak (2001) emphasizes, CDA is
not "a closed and 'finished' theory", and is characterized by "a large heterogeneity and
scholarly openness" (p.2). Hammersley (1997) even poignantly notes that "CDA is far
from being an unproblematic enterprise" (p.245).
As Blommaert & Bulcane (2000) note, one of the criticisms of CDA centers on
issues of interpretation. CDA has been criticized for being partial, selective, highly
interpretive, and ultimately prejudicial. People who hold this position are probably
positivists and post-positivists. They stick largely to realist perspective, tend to "search
for regularities through the scientific method" (Miller, 1995, p. 49), and assert a
value-free axiology. However, I believe this criticism is being far from reasonable and
convincing. Axiologically, CDA never takes a value-free position. Critical researchers
who employ CDA as methodological perspective are very self-reflexive and socially
responsible. Another criticism or limitation of CDA is about the mutual neglect and
ignorance among its different approaches (van Dijk, 1993, p. 279). This is partly because
there are many ways to do CDA by drawing on different paradigms, philosophies,
theories and methods. International, theoretical and methodological integration is
urgently needed to benefit the achievement of a common objective, namely to analyze,
reveal and combat inequality and injustice (van Dijk, 1993).
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Chapter 6: A Case Study Xinwen Lianbo (National Network News) on CCTV
Thus far I have set the stage for examining a case study which will demonstrate how
Chinese media propagate a belief system about "socialism with Chinese characteristics."
Fortunately, as a person who has eight years work experience with China Central
Television, I have had a good opportunity to observe this institution from different angles.
CCTV, the state television network, which is under the direct administration of the State
Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT), is China's biggest, most
authoritative and most prestigious national television network, and Xinwen Lianbo
(National Network News) is the most "reliable" and "popular" national daily news
program on CCTV. Xinwen Lianbo is one of the most authoritative information channels
that the party uses to release important news and provide guidance to the party members
and the public.
CCTV stands at the absolute forefront in China's television industry in regard to
influence, popularity and profitability. According to the inside data, CCTV realized
revenue of 13.98 billion Yuan in 2006, nearly 65% of which came from advertising. The
2009 CCTV New Year's Gala, the five-hour or so evening gala of the drama, dance,
comedy skit, acrobatics and song on the eve of Chinese Lunar New Year, brought more
than 600 million Yuan to CCTV! For the first time, program scripts and comedy dialogues
used product placement advertising. The network's auction of prime time slots of 2009
brought in 9.3 billion Yuan of advertising revenue alone, almost 16 percent higher than
that of 2008. It is worth noting that a majority of the revenue comes from the time slots
right before and after the news program Xinwen Lianbo.
For many years, this exclusive national television station has been the most important
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propaganda machine for the Chinese government to indoctrinate or persuade the Chinese
people that only the CPC can save China and usher in a new era of better life (the party's
decades-old mantra, also the lyric of the most popular song for decades- Without the CPC,
There Would Be No New China. In addition, Xinwen Lianbo is the most important vehicle
for the CPC to justify its preeminence in the eyes of Chinese people. At the same time,
marketization and commercialization are also broadly pervasive in the national
mouthpiece of the Chinese government. Making money is the top priority right after the
goal of indoctrinating socialist ideology. CCTV is carefully balancing the propaganda
machine and the apparatus of maximizing monopoly profit.
6.1 News Discourse on China Central Television
Decades ago, the ideological indoctrination fostered by the Chinese media in general
and news in particular, was entirely explicit. News played very important role in
constituting the social knowledge among the Chinese people that socialism was a superior
system. For example, one could not find coverage of crimes and disasters on Beijing
television in 1977 (Chang et al., 1994), and news coverage at that time mainly dealt with
the party lines and policies. Nowadays, it is not possible for the party to overtly
indoctrinate the Chinese people as it did decades ago. Today, ideological indoctrination
through news discourse is much more implicit. News on CCTV is concerned mainly with
China's national development and economic growth while insinuating that "only the CPC
can save China". The news does cover some crime and disaster stories representing "a
reasonable presentation of events in the real world" (Chang et al., 1994, p.58), but it
mainly casts its spotlight on the relief effort the party has made during these disasters.
Through content analysis, Chang (et al., 1994) found "national development and
economic reform themes significantly outnumbered all other themes and appeared mostly
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in domestic news" (p.59). I argue that the shift to more reports of news about economic
achievements, the superiority of the party's governance and the positive issues about
China serves the needs of promoting socialist ideology and the party's agenda. Although
news content on CCTV today is more subtle and discursive than that of decades ago, it
clearly indicates "politically tainted" manipulation and "cognitive mind control" (van
Dijk, 2006, p.359).
6.2 Xinwen Lianbo and CDA approach
Xinwen Lianbo, the half hour daily live news program aired on CCTV-1 (the highest
rated TV channel in China) and CCTV-News from 7 pm to 7:30 pm, has been
broadcasting since 1978 and is reportedly the news program with the largest audience in
the world, approximately 728 million. The program presents stories in the form of video
footage accompanied by the presenters' narration, sometimes the reporters' explanations
or interviews. Unlike the hosting style of hosts or anchors in other programs, which is
more flexible and interactive, the style of presenters of Xinwen Lianbo tends to be more
official, serious and rigid, which represents the official style of the party. The first couple
stories in the news program tend to focus on the important activities of the party leaders,
who are members of the Political Bureau Standing Committee of the CPC Central
Committee. The running order of these news stories is based on the political rankings of
the leaders concerned.
Almost all Party members and Party leaders in various levels watch the program and
view it as an official window into the newest Party concerns and propaganda trends. The
program is required to be aired at the same time on all the other 31 provinces' satellite TV
channels. Therefore, the program is the undisputed ratings leader among all Chinese daily
programs and the advertising price for the time right before and after the program is the
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most expensive in the Chinese media market. The general assumption here is that the
news discourse of this program serves to entrench the dominant socialist ideology and
seeks to sustain the current power relations in China.
The analysis is based on a sample which consists of two weeks programming from
April 16 to 29, 2008. This time period was chosen to avoid the extremely intense
coverage of the Olympics in June and July, but the sample does include many stories
about the torch relays of the games. The sample also evades the extensive special news
coverage of the severe earthquake in May, the extensive reporting on the Lhasa riots in
March, and the Olympic torch relay incidents in Paris and London in early April.
Although the programs during the sample period did cover relatively more news about the
Tibet issues, they represent the standard discourse or normal programming of Xinwen
Lianbo. The sample also allows me to demonstrate how Chinese media generally
manufacture the news, how it channels the direction of public opinion, and how the media,
directed by the party, produces and disseminates a hegemonic ideology.
Tools, such as framing, foregrounding, backgrounding, omission, presupposition,
insinuation, and topicalization (Fairclough, 1989; Huckin, 2001) will be employed to
analyze these programs. These concepts will help reveal the ideological nature of the
following key assumptions and frames: 1) Under the leadership of the CPC, China has
achieved and has been achieving remarkable success in all walks of life such as industry,
agriculture, the rule of law, and other economic or social sectors; 2) China participates in
a friendly international environment to build up a moderately prosperous socialist country
with Chinese characteristics and is always concerned with maintaining good relationships
with different countries; 3) The party attaches great importance to sovereignty, and have
gained international support for the Tibet and Taiwan issues; 4) manifest ideological
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indoctrination. I intend to structure the analysis in terms of the above mentioned themes
by critically analyzing all the relevant pieces of news of Xinwen Lianbo (designated as
XWLB hereafter) during the sampling period.
Since the assumptions of the project are concerned with how XWLB indoctrinates
socialist ideologies, it is necessary to briefly introduce ideological and theoretical basis of
the CPC.
6.3 Ideological and theoretical tradition of the Communist Party of China
In October 2007, the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of
China (NCCPC) amended and adopted a Party Constitution. The CPC takes
Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important
thought of Three Represents of Jiang Zeming as its ideological basis and guide to action
(NCCPC, 2007).
According to the new Party Constitution, Marxism-Leninism serves as the
preliminary theory for building the proletarian party. The thought of Mao Zedong, which
integrated the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism with Chinese conditions, "consists of
theoretical principles concerning the revolution and construction in China." It relates how
the CPC won victory in the new-democratic revolution and founded the People's
Republic of China. Deng Xiaoping theory contributed "the line, principles and policies
concerning building socialism with Chinese characteristics." The important thought of
Three Represents, the new theory which Jiang Zemin set forth, asserts that the CPC
always "represents the development trend of China's advanced productive forces, the
orientation of China's advanced culture and the fundamental interests of the
overwhelming majority of the Chinese people" (NCCPC, 2007).
Another "important guiding principle for China's economic and social development"
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and "major strategic thought" is the Scientific Outlook on Development:
Since the Sixteenth National Congress, the Central Committee of the party has followed the
guidance of Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of Three Represents and, by
pooling the wisdom of the whole Party to meet new requirements of development, formulated the
Scientific Outlook on Development, which puts people first and calls for comprehensive,
balanced and sustainable development. The outlook is a scientific theory that is in the same line
as Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought
of Three Represents and keeps up with the times. (NCCPC, 2007)

Conducting ideological battles is a kind of tradition for the party. Decades ago,
especially during the Cultural Revolution, almost every adult Chinese was required to
study and recite Quotations from Chairman Mao to follow his teachings and instructions.
Since the opening up and reform started in 30 years ago, it has been perceived by the
party that the communist ideology is declining among both the party members and
ordinary Chinese people. Because of China's theoretical adherence to socialism, party
members at all levels are always required to attend events, seminars and conferences to
thoroughly study the ideological theories by integrating the theories with their work. The
media promotes it through ideological slogans such as "Three Represents", "Socialism
with Chinese Characteristics", and "Scientific Outlook on Development" etc. These
slogans and the illustrative quotes used in the analysis below are "official" translations
and may not reflect standard English. Because this is a study of ideological indoctrination,
it is important to work from official translations in order to reflect the Party's world view.
6.4 Revealing the party's ideological control
General economic progress
An April 16 news report on an executive meeting of the State Council presided over
by Premier Wen Jiabao stated "China has made great success in fighting the snow
devastation and in restoration work in disaster areas" and that China's economy "is
maintaining stable growth momentum" and "is on the desired track of macro-economic
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control". The news also suggested that all economic sectors have maintained rapid and
steady growth so far in 2008 and that "the overall economic situation is better than
expected", despite the worst winter snow storm in half a century and a harsh global
economic environment. The news story asserted that China's economic restructuring has
made new progress due to the opening-up policy and reforms. In terms of the severe snow
and ice storm, Wu Bangguo, China's top legislator, on another occasion claimed the party
Central Committee and the State Council "promptly adopted effective measures" and
described the disaster combating and relief as "a great victory" (April 24). A critical look
at the story reveals that the news was infused with ideologically motivated content
without detailing the fact that skyrocketing food prices caused by the disastrous winter
snow made it hard for low income groups to afford pork and vegetables. It is not hard to
see that news discourse skillfully foregrounds the positive information that rationalizes
the government's political power. In addition, when XWLB covers disasters or other
negative stories, it always foregrounds the relief efforts the government has made while
backgrounding and omitting the details or aftermath of the catastrophes themselves.
XWLB produced a long story to cover the celebration of 20th anniversary of the
largest special economic zone (SEZ) in Hainan Province (April 26). The news highlighted
a set of statistics, such as 7.6-fold increase in Hainan's GDP, a soaring ten-fold increase in
disposable income for urban dwellers and a 6.6 times jump in net income for farmers, to
show "the great overall economic progress" it has made within the 20 years, emphasizing
that "following the guidance of Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of Three
Represents, and the Scientific Outlook on Development, the Hainan SEZ continues to
reform and open up in the road of building socialism with Chinese characteristics". Vice
Premier Li Keqiang, who "represented Central Committee of the CPC and State Council
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to participate in the celebration", delivered "an important remark", stressing that "Hainan
should hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics and rally
closely around the CPC Central Committee with comrade Hu Jintao as the General
Secretary to maintain speedy and quality economic development". Li also added that
"setting up SEZs was an important measure of China's great undertakings of reform and
opening-up" and fully confirmed "the historical achievement" of the party's policy. The
news not only insinuated that under the leadership of the party, Hainan made such great
economic progress, but also reiterated the socialist theoretical basis of China.
China's economic growth was previously thought to be overheated. The government
therefore implemented a series of macro-control measures to slow down the red-hot
growth. An April 16 story covered a set of statistics released by National Bureau of
Statistics of China. The statistics presented verified "the Chinese economy maintains
steady and fast growth with 10.6% growth to 6149.1 billion Yuan in the first quarter of
2008, 1.1% lower than the same period of 2007", and that "the country's macro-control
measures are effective".
Growing tax revenues are also seen as contributing to the prosperous picture of
China's economy. Tax revenue in the first quarter of 2008 grew to 1510.2 billion Yuan,
33.8 percent higher than the same period of last year (16 April). Also, a stable labour
market is said to be key for the party to maintain "a stable and harmonious society" to
which the party always attaches great importance. Covering a trans-ministries meeting on
employment hosted by Vice Premier Zhang Dejiang, a story stated that "after years of
concerted efforts, the unemployment rate in urban areas have seen a steady decline"
(April 24). The news foregrounded "the proactive policies" on job creation and
unemployment reduction, while omitting the serious employment problems faced by the
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thousands of the college graduates each year and unfair treatment of "farmer workers".
As Fairclough (1989) puts it, power is exercised "more particularly through the
ideological workings of language ... [which] has become perhaps the primary medium of
social control and power" (p. 2-3). In this case, by foregrounding the overall economic
success the party has made and ideological theories of the party, the media discourse
confirms "the superiority of the party".
Industry
In dealing with news about industrial sector, XWLB mainly casts its light on major
breakthroughs made by some companies, improvements in energy, resource, and
environmental conservation, and advancement of giant projects, etc. Achievements are
foregrounded, with emphasizing certain words such as "the largest", "the most advanced",
"successfully" or "the best" in the news. Presuppositions embedded in the discourse
illustrate that, to borrow from President Hu (October 15, 2007), "China's overall strength
grew considerably" and its "international standing and influence rose notably", of course,
"under the leadership of the CPC".
In reporting on a newly manufactured gantry crane by DHI DCW Group, a
state-owned enterprise based in the city of Dalian, the story said the crane was the
"currently largest crane in the world" and able to lift three times as much as the
previously largest crane in the world (April 18). The significance of this was that "the
newly made gantry crane will drastically change the manufacturing process of deepwater
offshore drilling rigs".
An April 18 story on Chinese steelmaking giant Sinosteel Jilin Corporation praised it
for "stimulating technological innovation, implementing industrial restructure, and
successfully conserving energy and reducing emissions" while reporting on
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environmental dust control equipment used by the company. "By conserving the energy
and recycling industrious wastes, we realized 110 million Yuan in 2007", said Zhenyue
Chang, Chairman of the company. The news singled out one company and foregrounded
its improvements in energy conservation, while omitting the serious problems of pollution
from numerous factories. Lake Tai, one of the major previous tourist attractions and
famous for its beauty, was seriously hit by the algae blooms in 2008 and in a panic people
in that region bought bottled water as drinking water. Qingdao, the coastal city for Beijing
Olympic sailing regatta, was also hit by the algal blooms six weeks before the 2008
Games. Chinese heavy industry relies mostly on the dirtiest energy, coal, keeping
industrial cities wrapped in a gray shroud.
Another story on the same day asserted "Premier Wen Jiabao attended the
ground-breaking ceremony of the construction of high-speed railway line linking Beijing
and Shanghai", and stated that the railway line would be "the world's first-rate project"
once completed. The story also stated "the designed speed for the 1,318-kilometer-track
for the rail service is 350 kilometers per hour" and it "will be both the longest and the
fastest railway line in the world". What was foregrounded here was "technological
innovation", "self-designed" and "domestically produced". An April 17 story on the
upcoming Olympics titled "Good Luck Beijing- Shooting Sport Testing Match" claimed
"the Beijing Shooting Range Hall is best one in the World" (April 17). Another story on
"the world's longest" cross-sea bridge -Hangzhou Bay Cross-sea Bridge, would be open
to traffic, and it would "bring about the economic integration of the Yangtze Delta area",
a major powerhouse of China's economy (April 23). The story foregrounded the benefits
of the project such as lowering the transportation costs and boosting economy of the
region.
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The editorial voice was similarly grounded in a discourse of "self-designed",
"self-innovated" and "domestically produced", as XWLB reported China's construction
machinery industry, claiming the sales revenue of the industry in 2007 "ranked second in
the world" (April 23). The news was blithely confident about the industry, as it
anticipated "more and more enterprises are on the path of self-innovation" instead of
merely adapting and assimilating the technology of other countries.
The party initiated a propaganda campaign on the theme of "self-innovation" and
"self-design" of Chinese enterprises to show off the achievements they have made.
According to an announcement of XWLB (April 23), other national news outlets such as
Xinhua News Agency, People's Daily, Guanmin Daily, Economic Daily News, and
CCTV.com would intensively report on China's "self-innovated" industry.
"The first self-designed and domestically produced composite shield machine was
finished", a story asserted while covering the construction of a tunnel (April 26). Entitled
"Self-innovated Products Dominate China Computer Numerical Control (CNC) Machine
Tool Fair", the story continued to focus on "self-innovation" and promoting "domestic
brands", claiming that "some of Chinese self-innovated machine tools represent most
advanced in the world" (April 23). "With 123,000 CNC Machines manufactured in 2007,
China has become the world's largest CNC machine producer", the story stressed.
"By technological innovation, Wuxi Suntech Power Co., Ltd, a previous small private
company, has become one of the world's top three photovoltaic cells and modules
producers", according to a news report presented on April 24. The story also stressed the
high conversion efficiency of the company's solar cells, claiming that the solar cells
"possessed highest conversion efficiency in the world among the same kind of products".
The news claimed Suntech as a model company which "holds high the great banner of
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socialism with Chinese characteristics, thoroughly applies the Scientific Outlook on
Development, and carefully implements guiding principles of the 17th NCPC". Actually,
Suntech, a private company, which went public on the New York Stock Exchange in 2005
and is leading the industry in providing innovative solar energy solutions, has nothing to
do with the socialist ideologies.
China's aerospace program has long been the focus of enormous national pride since it
successfully launched its first man-made satellite in 1970. News in the field of aerospace
can often be seen. An April 24 story on the Global Space Development Summit Held in
Beijing claimed "China will launch a large carrier rocket, which has a capacity to carry 14
tonnes and the capacity of our current carrier rocket is 5.1 tonnes". China's first data relay
satellite "Tianlian 1" was "successfully launched" and would be used "for the first time
during the Shenzhou VII manned spaceflight" to "greatly" monitor and track the
spaceflight, an April 26 story asserted. "The launch is the 105th successful mission in a
row of China's Long March series of rockets since 1996, and the continuous successful
launching rate ranks the first in the world".
Agriculture
For a long time, Chinese agriculture has been the foundation of the national economy.
China's rural population accounts for a majority of its total population. To maintain the
overall political and social stability of China and to realize "agricultural modernization
with Chinese characteristics" (Hu, 2007), the party needs to generate a promising and
prosperous agriculture sector. XWLB, as the most important mouthpiece of the party,
plays important role in addressing the party's agenda. Therefore, news on XWLB about
agriculture and rural farmers is always positively rendered. The agriculture sector always
sees favorable growth and lives of rural farmers enjoy continuous improvement, but the
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problems and the difficulties in the field of agriculture are not even broached.
As a news story on 17 April puts it, "steady progress was made in wheat production
due to the effective measures implemented by major wheat-producing provinces" and the
"central government increased the direct subsidies to all grain farmers to 78.9 billion
Yuan this year". The news also foregrounded that the subsides were "largest ever" and
how the government enthusiastically addressed the concerns of rural farmers, however,
without detailing the fact that the cost of purchasing agriculture machinery, tools and
fertilizer had drastically increased. XWLB never mentions that rural farmers are "the least
privileged" and are denied "many welfare benefits and rights" by "a residency permit
system" (Harvey, 2005, p. 125). China's urban-rural gap is a serious social phenomenon.
The rural population lags far behind urban residents in such areas as income, education,
employment and social benefits etc. XWLB never reports those problems.
The campaign to build "ecological civilization villages" in Hainan province, the
largest special economic zone in China, "has made key progress to create the new
socialist countryside" (April 26). The story asserted the agricultural products made by
such villages were more "ecologically friendly" and more "safe to consume".
China's Efforts and Achievements in Promoting the Rule of Law
Coverage of how Chinese legislators handle complaints made by individuals or
groups through letters and visits used phrasings such as "excellent improvement" and
"delightful changes", to generalize the current situation in this field (April 23). The recent
decrease from 2005 in the number of petitions submitted was seen as a contrast to the 12
years continuous increase and was cited as the sole piece of evidence for the effectiveness
of Regulations on Letters and Visits enacted in 2005. The story even did not address one
possibility that the regulations frighten off some petitions.
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An April 23 story covered proposals for assisting disabled persons issued by the
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council. The story
asserted "the undertakings for the disabled persons are the main parts of the undertakings
of socialism with Chinese characteristics;" "the party and the government concern and
attach great importance to the undertakings for the disabled persons for a long run"; and
"the environment and conditions for disabled persons to participate in social life have
been greatly improved". The story went on to state that "the lives of disabled persons
have been constantly bettered" and "the development of the undertakings for disabled
persons in China has gained unanimous international recognition and praise".
The Standing Committee of the 11th National People's Congress (NPC) adopted the
amendment to the Law on Protection of the Disabled, according to XWLB (April 24). Wu,
Bangguo, chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC, said that "boosting
development of undertakings for the disabled and improving the environment for them
are one of main tasks of building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and a
harmonious socialist society." The recent attention paid to the disabled by the CPC was to
set up a sound environment for the upcoming Paralympics right after Beijing 2008
Olympic Games. Additionally, the politically hollow words of the party are highly
foregrounded to demonstrate "the excellence and superiority of socialism with Chinese
characteristics," while the problems and details of the situations of disabled persons are
omitted. In China discriminatory employment practices toward persons with disabilities
are never ending. Both public and private employers are accused of rejecting people with
physical disabilities, neglecting the regulation that the disabled should comprise a
minimum of 1.5 percent of all employees, and "there is little evidence of official efforts to
enforce that quota" (HRW, 2007). In most cities or towns except some big cities such as
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Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou etc, it is difficult for the disabled to go out in public
because of the lack of physical access. Students with physical disabilities are often
rejected by universities.
An April 17 story reported that "the protection of intellectual property right has
realized leaping development". By foregrounding this kind of information, including
statements such as China "has processed 100 million patent application cases in one and a
half year" and "the amount of captured pirated products was more than 75 million" while
omitting the serious situation of infringement of intellectual property in China. The news
effectively thwarts any critical or contradictory facts which would allow viewers to
generate a more nuanced perspective.
A "friendly" international environment, theTibet issue, and the national vride
In framing China's foreign ties with other countries, and with its important economic
partners in particular, XWLB tries to project that China maintains pleasant, strategic, and
reciprocal relationships with its trade partners and plays a positive role in the world arena.
Covering President Hu Jintao's meeting with a delegation of Japan's two primary
parties, XWLB cited Hu's remarks that Sino-Japanese relations are "developing" and
"exchanges and cooperation have enhanced" by "continuing consultations about regional
and international affairs and major issues of both concern" and that "China values
Sino-Japanese relations, and developing long-term and good-neighborly relations has
been our consistent guideline" (16 April, 2008). The report continued with the two
visiting party leaders' favorable assessment of the relationship of the two countries and
Japan's commitment of supporting the Beijing Olympic Games.
Another story on April 25 reporting Hu Jintao's meeting with the European Union
(EU) Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso asserted that both leaders "committed
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to developing a strategic partnership" and agreed that "robust China-EU ties were vital to
the international society". Barroso also expressed his good wish for a successful Beijing
Olympics. When covering a joint press conference between Premier Wen Jiabao and
visiting Barroso on the same day, XWLB foregrouded that "the Sino-EU start high-level
economic and trade dialogue" and "all member countries of EU respect China's
sovereignty and integrity and admit Taiwan and Tibet are parts of China". "Trade
tensions", such as "trade surplus, product piracy and currency controls" in China, were
areas in which the EU stepped up pressure on Beijing for this visit (AOL, 2008), but were
never mentioned in the story.
On another occasion, Jia Qinglin, chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), China's top advisory body, met
with Tran Van Hang, member of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee
(April 23). Jia said that the two countries "have enjoyed a sound growth of bilateral
relations" and "views the relations from a strategic viewpoint". He also "applauded
Vietnam's support of China in Tibet and Taiwan issues". Tran Van Hang said "the Beijing
Olympics are a grand event for all people in the world", and he "wished success for the
Beijing Olympic Games".
In reporting the Chinese Vice President's meeting with Dick Ebersol, US broadcaster
NBC's Olympics chief, XWLB stressed that NBC would "continue to spare no effort to
support" the games' preparatory work and wished for a "a great and successful games"
(April 23).
When meeting with visiting South African Foreign Minister Nkosazana
Dlamini-Zuma, Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping commented that the "strategic"
Sino-South African relations had "comprehensively developed", and said that cooperation
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in such fields as politics, trade, consultation in international affairs, and education was
"fruitful" (April 23).
In an April 18 story on Xi Jinping's meeting with former Japanese Prime Minister
Tomiichi Murayama and Ikuo Hirayama, president of Japan-China association for
friendship, Xi said that the cooperation between the two countries was "stable" and
"healthy" and contributed to "the peace and stability of Asia and the world", while
Tomiichi Murayama expressed support for the Beijing Olympic Games from the Japanese
side and wished for their success. When meeting with visiting Yoshinobu Ishikawa,
governor of Shizuoka Prefecture of Japan, Xi said that President Hu Jintao's upcoming
trip to Japan was "a great event" in Sino-Japanese relations "in the new period" (April 23).
They both regarded the mutual understanding and friendship as "the fundamental interests
of the two peoples". All these stories foregrounded the reciprocal and strategic
Sino-Japanese relationship. However, historical confrontations, difficulties and even
animosity which the two countries have experienced can never be neglected. The
bitterness began with Sino-Japanese War (Jiawu War) from 1894 to 1895, which resulted
in an imposed Treaty of Shimonoseki. In addition, many Chinese people still bear a
grudge against Japan because of the brutal and inhuman genocidal war crimes committed
by the Japanese military in China during the World War II. More recently, the Japanese
government approved a new textbook that glossed over or minimized its wartime
atrocities, fanning feverous anger among the Chinese people against Japan and resulting
in protests vandalizing the Japanese embassy in Beijing and consulate in. Disputes over
territory in the East China Sea have long been a sensitive issue between the two countries.
Positively rendering the Sino-Japanese relations, while omitting the difficulties between
the two nations, apparently adds legitimacy to China's opening up policy and to its
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commitment for economic development.
An April 26 story covered the meeting between Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf
and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani and visiting Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi
and "reiterated their resolve to improve bilateral ties to a new level". "Pakistan will
always stand with China on the Taiwan and Tibet issues and wish Beijing Olympics a
great success", the story quoted the Pakistan leaders as saying. Reporting on Yang's visit
to Bangladesh on April 24, XWLB stressed that the country "accords great importance to
the relationship with China" and "Bangladesh has extended support to One-China
policy".
The Beijing 2008 Olympic Games were viewed as one of the most important events
for both the party and the Chinese people. For the people, it marked country's arrival on
the world stage, and for the party, the games were viewed as the great chance to
demonstrate the unprecedented economic success China has achieved.
When dealing with the torch relay of Beijing 2008 Olympic Games in Islamabad
Pakistan, the news (April 16) showed the footage of Musharraf, the president of Pakistan,
who spoke during his visit in China from April 10 to April 15 that "there is no one in
Pakistan who would do anything against the interest of China" and that "we will take all
measures to ensure the security of the torch relay". Both President Pervez Musharraf and
Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani attended and spoke at the opening ceremony of the
torch relay, which signifies the deep friendship between two countries. The news also
covered an interview with one of Pakistan torch bearers who said "we are very excited to
have the torch come to Islamabad and thank you guys (for) giving us the opportunity".
The news foregrounded the strong relationship between the two countries without
mentioning that the relay route was drastically changed and "confined" "in the limited
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space" due to the security concerns (BBC news, April 16, 2008). The torch relay in New
Deli, India, was rendered as "successful" and "harmonious" (April 18), omitting the
shortening of the relay route and the extremely heavy security along the relay route over
the fears of the disruption from protests. In reporting the Thai(April 19), Indonesia (April
21), Australian (April 23), Japanese (April 26) and South Korean (April 27) of the torch
relay, XWLB routinely used lengthy video portraying the torch as being welcomed by
numerous Chinese national flags and loud cheers, such as "Go China! Go Beijing! Go
Olympics!", and by warm smiles in an overall festive mood, without covering any
protests or different voices. XWLB also reported on how the leg cities attached great
importance to the torch relays and how the cities were well prepared for the events. The
news program exerted great efforts to filter any negative information about China and the
Beijing Olympics.
However hard it tried, China's desire to project "a favorable international
environment" as it builds the Xiaokang Society (a moderately prosperous society) and as
it was striving to hold the most successful Olympics ever, many Western media distorted
reporting on Tibetan Lhasa riot in March by using photographs of Tibetan demonstrators
clashing with riot police in Nepal; French President Nicolas Sarkozy openly threatened to
boycott the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games; the protests and chaos
disrupted the torch relay in such international legs as London, Paris, San Francisco and
Nagano etc; Paris Mayor Bertrand Delanoe awarded honorary citizenship to the exiled
Tibetan Buddhist spiritual leader Dalai Lama; In addition, on April 9, 2008, CNN
commentator Jack Cafferty overtly offended the Chinese people by claiming "the same
bunch of goons and thugs they've been for the last 50 years" on Situation Room. For the
most of the Chinese people, the 2008 Beijing Olympics meant far more than an
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international sport event, and hosting the games was associated with nationalist pride and
was meant to signify the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation from its image as a disastrous
and humiliated semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. All these incidents happened
several months before the Beijing Olympics and helped to fan a nationwide nationalistic
fervor in China.
The party usually restricts all kinds of demonstrations and protests. Anti-western
demonstrations, which were reportedly tacitly allowed by the party, happened in some big
cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Wuhan etc. People started to boycott French
products and refused to shop at Carrefour, the French supermarket chain. The website
www.anti-CNN.com, which was spontaneously created by a few patriotic young men in
March 2008 to reveal the media biases of the Western media, once became one of the
hottest websites in China. "Don't be too CNN" became a fad phrase in China. Overall, the
patriotic fervor and nationalistic temper hit a fever pitch right before the Games.
However, the eruption of nationalist sentiment in China was also a source of concern
to the party. The party feared that the protests might "spill out of control" and that the
feverous patriotic tempers would "scare away Western investors and even threaten the
communist regime" (Kommersant, 2008). In addition, it was not easy for the party to
successfully hold the forthcoming Beijing Olympics in such an uneasy environment.
Critically looking at XWLB during the sample period found that the program played a key
role in calming the ardent patriotic fervor and promoting "rational patriotism". XWLB, the
most important ideological apparatus of the party, on the one hand initiated an extensive
propaganda campaign on Tibet issue to rationalize its governance on this region, and on
the other hand, projected a "rational patriotism" under the direction of the party to insure
the anti-West protests did not harm China's international image.
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Because the Tibet issue is one of the most sensitive issues for the party, XWLB takes
the party's line and mainly foregrounds the following frames: 1) Economic progress and
improvement of Tibetan people's well-being. 2) Freedom of religious belief. 3) The
thriving of Tibetan culture and language. 4) The Lhasa riot and Dalai Lama's conspiracy
to separate Tibet from China.
XWLB emphatically supports the claim that the Chinese government makes every
effort to protect and promote Tibetan cultural heritage. "Tibetan government at all levels
strives to foster education in both Tibetan and Chinese", and news reports continued to
stress that "Tibetan is a required course for the students in the region" and that "education
in Tibetan language has become one of the priorities of the regional government" (April
16). Xiang- Chuchengjiangchu, Vice President of the Buddhist Association of Yunnan
province and famous doctor of traditional Tibetan medicine, said in an interview with
XWLB that "Tibetan culture has made tremendous development under the leadership of
the CPC" (April 23). A story on April 25 spotlighted "the new Tibet's fantastic and
colourful religion culture" (April 25) by interviewing Luosang Cicheng, the leading sutra
reciting master at Sera Monastery of Tibet. Qiabai Cidanpingcuo, a Tibetan culture
researcher and also a former member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference, said in an interview with XWLB that "Tibetan culture is well protected and
developed by the Chinese government" and "more Tibetans can read and write Tibetan"
(April 26). All of this news discourse is directly aimed to refute the West's allegations
about the party's "cultural genocide", signifying how the media discourse advanced the
party's political agenda.
A story concerning the Tibetan religion (April 22) used a video footage of ongoing
Tibetan Buddhist activities in the Potala Palace, Lhasa and interviewed Caidan Banjue,
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Chief of the Administration Office of Committee for Ethnic and Religious Affairs of Tibet,
who said "the Tibetan people fully enjoy the right to the freedom of religious belief'.
Another news story headlined "I Saw a Different Tibet" presented an interview with
Paul Dubrule, a former French senator and chairman and founder of the multinational
hotel group Accor Group. In 2002, he made a 15,272 Kilometers journey by bike from
Fontainebleau, France to Tibet, China and stayed in Tibet for three months, which "gave
him a chance to see a different Tibet from what he had learnt in France" (April 22).
Dubrule also said "I saw that Chinese government constructed roads, airport, schools and
hospitals, which represent the economic development". Immediately following the two
pieces of Tibet related news, XWLB introduced a newly published bilingual book, Tibet:
Past and Present and said that it "demonstrated the remarkable progress in the new
Tibet's economy, politics, and culture under the leadership of Chinese central
government" and "described the miserable and wretched life of serfs under the feudal
serfdom system of old Tibet" (April 22). Throughout the news discourse, "new Tibet"
was used to insinuate an advance in the development and improvement of Tibetans'
well-being under the leadership of the CPC, while "old Tibet" was used to insinuate
backwardness, cruelty, and pain.
XWLB aired an interview with Amos Gelb, an associate professor in communication
at the George Washington University on April 23 to demonstrate the Western media's
biased reporting on Lhasa riot and torch relay protests. Gelb said that "the camera can lie,
and the camera can give you a snapshot, a little picture that makes you think something is
happening that isn't

the camera doesn't give an exact representation of everything."

Salong Pingla, living Buddha of Gelug and Standing Director of the Buddhist
Association of Tibet, said on April 24 with an interview with XWLB that the "Dalai Lama
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clique have been abusing power of religion to separate Tibet from the motherland. Their
conspiracy will never succeed, because China is under the great leadership of the CPC".
The living Buddha also condemned the "Dalai clique's separatist activities in the 3.14
Lhasa riot", saying "the violent sabotage acts run counter to the Buddhist tenets".
Reporting on visiting Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi' meeting with Secretary
of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee Nong Due Manh and Vietnamese
Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, XWLB foregrounded Vietnam's support of "China's
great cause of the reunification and China's handling of recent riots in Lhasa to protect
national stability" (April 24).
In an interview with former Japanese Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka in Tokyo on
April 24, XWLB quoted Makiko Tanaka as saying that "interfering with Tibetan affairs is
interfering with Chinese internal affairs", and Dalai Lama's real intent is to seek
independence of Tibet rather than to ask autonomy of Tibet.
An April 25 story announced the party's statement about resuming talks with the
Dalai Lama. "The policy of the central government towards Dalai has been consistent and
the door of dialogue has always been open" presented the anchor, continuing that "the
Dalai side should take credible action to stop splitting China, stop plotting violent riot,
and stop sabotaging the Beijing Olympic Games".
XWLB interviewed the Tibetan party leaders who by no means stand in a different
position from the party. The program foregrounded the remarks of leaders of foreign
countries which have diplomatic relations with China on the premise of supporting
China's territorial integrity. It omitted all the details of criticism from outside China and
only rendered the criticism as "creating difficulties for China on Tibet issue". The
reporting on Tibet issue can be seen as one of the typical examples of what happens when
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Chinese media team up with the Chinese government to "manufacture consent" among
the Chinese people.
Regarding the party's propaganda campaign for "rational" expressions of patriotism,
XWLB skillfully made efforts to fulfill the party's agenda.

An April 21 story presented

the commentary titled "Patriotic Enthusiasm and National Interests" on People's Daily, an
official paper of the party. "As individuals, we have the right to express our patriotic
sentiments. As citizens, we have the responsibility to bear in mind the country's overall
interests and rationally express patriotic aspiration.. .In the current situation, taking
actions to maintain social stability, boosting economic development, and successfully
holding the Beijing Olympics are best means to smash the conspiracy of containing China
and tarnishing China and are also best way to express patriotism," the anchor said.
An April 22 story extensively covered how students and professors at different
universities effectively expressed rational nationalistic sentiments. A professor at the
Beijing Normal University said in an interview with XWLB "the way to express patriotic
sentiment should comply with China's economic development agendas". The news
anchor asserted "many universities set up forums on the university websites to discuss
rational nationalism". A student at Tsinghua University said "irrational patriotism and
extreme actions would play into the hands of Western anti-China group and those wishing
to separate China, while rational patriotism would smash their conspiracies". The story
went on to interview students and professors and to present a couple of similar thoughts
made by students of different universities. Finally, the story generalized "students should
transfer their strong patriotic sentiments to their studies and enhance their ability to
contribute to build a more powerful country in the future". Another story on the same day
also tried to calm down the patriotic fever pitch, but in a more implicit way. The story
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quoted an official of Ministry of Commerce as saying that "Carrefour employed more
than 40,000 local workers, accounting for 99 percent of its headcounts in China", and "it
has annual sales volume of nearly 30 billion Yuan". "95 percent of the products it sells
are made in China". The story also stressed that the "French government and companies
have taken positive actions to repair Sino-French relations" and "some companies,
including Carrefour, have issued statements to oppose Tibetan independence and support
the Beijing Olympics".
During the sample period, there were four stories highly praising Dou Tiecheng, a
model worker at China Railway First Group. One story asserted "Dou has made
outstanding contribution to reform and opening-up", calling for the working class to learn
from "Tiecheng Spirit" to express patriotism in a rational way. Three other stories
foregrounded how workers in all walks of life learn from Dou to build the country. "We
Chinese people should channel our patriotic fervor into a rational track and transform it
into actions to do our work well" said a worker interviewed by XWLB on April 24.
Aiming clearly to advance the party's agenda of maintaining social stability, XWLB
unexpectedly produced four stories to publicize and foreground the advanced deeds of
Dou Tiecheng.
As anger at France and the consumer boycott campaign against French products
continued, Paris sought to soothe the tensions between the two countries. XWLB
conducted immense reporting on France's effort to repair diplomatic relations, aiming to
both relieve the patriotic fervor among Chinese people and illustrate China's rising
international influence.
During a meeting with Hu Jintao, visiting French Senate President Poncelet said that
"the French government respects China's sovereignty and territorial integrity" in terms of
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the Tibet and Taiwan issues (April 24). Poncelet said that "he felt sad and regretful for the
disturbance of the Beijing Olympic torch relay in Paris" and that "French people nourish
deep and special feelings towards Chinese people and the French government cherishes
the strategic ties with China."
An April 25 story also reported that Jia Qinglin, Chairman of NPPCC, met with
Poncelet. Poncelet said that "the disruption of torch relay in Paris is the extreme activity
of a small group" and the incidents "made Parisians in distress and regret." He also said
that "the French people opposed relating sports with politics" and wished the "Beijing
Olympics a tremendous success." "Jia expressed appreciation for France's support to the
one-China policy and its rigid opposition to 'Taiwan independence' and 'Tibet
independence.'" Another story on the same day dealt with signing a pact on a
parliamentary exchange mechanism between Wu Bangguo and Christian Poncelet. Both
sides believed that "the exchange and cooperation between the National People's
Congress and French senate entered a new stage". Similarly, news discourse repeatedly
stressed the French people's deep feelings toward Chinese people and France's regret for
the torch relay incidents in Paris.
XWLB covered Premier Wen Jiabao's meeting with visiting former French Prime
Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin (April 24). "France attaches importance to the
comprehensive strategic partnership with China" said Raffarin, stressing France's support
for a "one-China policy". "Raffarin expressed sorrow for the incidents of the torch relay
in Paris" and "wished a success for the August Games."
Stories that France took initiative to improve the recently damaged Sino-France
relations appeared very frequently. An April 27 story broadcast Xi Jinping's meeting with
Jean-David Levitte, French President Sarkozy's top diplomatic envoy, to discuss the
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restrained ties. Xi called for "concrete actions" to be taken by French side to promote
relations. Levitte said the French government and President Sarkozy "were ready to do all
they could" to "strengthen the comprehensive strategic partnership with China".
Leadership superiority/ Manifest Ideology Indoctrination
He Guoqiang, member of the Political Bureau Standing Committee of the CPC
Central Committee and Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection
(CCDI) of the CPC, toured the Hunan province to inspect the work of newly elected
leaders at the first plenary session of the 17th CPC Central Committee in 2007 (16 April).
He stressed that leaders in all levels should "carefully study and thoroughly implement
the spirit of the 17th National Congress of Communist Party" (NCCP), "ensure the
decisions of the Central Committee of the CPC are carried out without fail" and "improve
the party's style of work".
CCID initiated the party's ideological campaign, which was named "Be Loyal
Guardians of the party and True Carriers of the People's Interests", He Guoqiang stressed
CCDI officials should "hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese
characteristics, follow the guidance of Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought
of Three Represents, thoroughly apply the Scientific Outlook on Development" (22 April).
He continued to say that "CCDI officials should be utterly loyal to the party and country",
"set up an amicable, trustworthy and respectable image among the people" and "keep up
with the times and work hard with a pioneering and innovative spirit".
XWLB's thorough April 24 reporting on the second meeting of the 11th National
People's Congress (NPC, China's top legislature) Standing Committee and gave a special
focus on the statement made by Wu Bangguo, China's top legislator, who called all party
members, "under the leadership of the CPC", to "implement the party's line, principles,
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and policies... and to serve the purpose of building socialism with Chinese
characteristics". Wu also required all the lawmakers to "strengthen their studies and
research on the Scientific Outlook on Development".
Li Changchun, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the
CPC Central Committee, made the "important remarks" at a work conference of the
Marxism Theory Research and Construction Project held in Beijing on April 25. XWLB
extensively covered Li's remarks, most of which are hollow ideological words repeatedly
used by different senior Chinese leaders. Li required Marxist scholars to "thoroughly
study and implement guiding principles of the party's 17th NPC and intensively enhance
research and education on the application of Marxist theory in socialism with Chinese
characteristics". The senior Chinese leader also asked Marxist scholars to "keep up with
times to provide theoretical support and spiritual momentum for the development of
socialism with Chinese characteristics". In addition, Li said that "with the great concern
and important direction from the CPC Central Committee led by Comrade Hu Jintao, the
project has made substantial progress, cemented the main theme of Marxism with the
field of philosophy and social science, solidified the party's base for theory, and become a
strategic project regarding building socialism with Chinese characteristics". Finally, Li
stressed that "all scholars should hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese
characteristics, follow the guidance of Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought
of Three Represents, thoroughly apply the Scientific Outlook on Development,
emancipate the mind, seek truth from facts, keep up with times, greatly pursue innovation
in theory, and make great headways in establishing the theoretic framework for building
socialism with Chinese characteristics..."
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
In the first three decades beginning with the establishment of People's Republic of
China in 1949, a top-down communication system served as the ultimate apparatus for the
party to mobilize, educate, organize the masses and strengthen the party's political control.
Of course, the media during that period of time never served the public interest or
addressed public concerns.
Economic reforms and the opening-up policy, which were launched in 1978,
represent a watershed moment for China's economic development. The neoliberalization
introduced by the economic reforms happened to coincide "with the turn to neoliberal
solutions" in the United States (Harvey, 2005, p. 120) which initiated by Ronald Reagan.
The communication system in both the world's strongest capitalist economy, the United
States, and the largest socialist developing country, China, are distinctly wedded to
neoliberalism. Neoliberalization has thus proliferated on the world stage. "Neoliberalism
with 'Chinese Characteristics'", as Harvey (2005) names it, has been sweeping and
permeating all sections of China since the economic reforms. Chinese media have been
transformed into a contradictory system which is both party-controlled and
market-oriented.
7.1 Mediascape: "In the name of Socialism with Chinese characteristics"
The preceding analysis in Chapter Four outlined the historical transformation of the
Chinese media system and delineated its current "ambiguities and contradictions" (Lee,
1994) caused by the dual forces neoliberalism and "authoritarian centralized control"
(Harvey, 2005, p. 120).
As it perceived that the communist ideology is declining among both the party
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members and ordinary Chinese people, the party has continued to impose its firm control
and serious censorship on the Chinese media. The media under the socialist command
model of control first and foremost serve as "the mouthpiece" of the CPC. As illustrated
by the case study of Xinwen Lianbo, the Chinese media are controlled and used by the
party to indoctrinate the party lines, principles and ideologies and to advance the agendas
of ruling powers. The case study vividly demonstrates how consent was manufactured
and how the Chinese masses are mobilized and organized. What should also be stressed is
that the party does not show any mercy to those who challenge its ideology or its
superiority. In Chapter Four, Freezing Point and Beijing News are typical examples in this
regard.
When the party introduced the market economy and decreased or canceled the
subsidies to the media, the media unleashed by the market forces have undergone a
process of "neoliberalization," favoring of free market operation and capitalizing the
audience. What is also noteworthy is that WTO membership and globalization simplify
and rationalize the proliferation of free market in the Chinese communication industry.
Furthermore, the political economy of Chinese new media, like the traditional media,
serves both political powers and commercial interests, and can hardly realize its
democratic potential. The media are providing a wide range of content, formats and
programming to respond to market demands and to cater to the advertisers, the business
elite, and the wealthy urban Chinese. Almost all media platforms are now entirely relying
on advertising revenue or other commercial operations.
Therefore, I conclude economic reforms, ownership and editorial control of Chinese
government, along with WTO membership and new media technologies, interplay and
interact to produce a new Chinese mediascape, a contradictory combination of capitalist
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neoliberalism, which is concerned with advertisers and business interests, and a socialist
propaganda machine, which firmly promulgates the party's ideological indoctrination.
Significantly, the contradictory mix sings sweetly in the name of the powerful myth"socialism with Chinese characteristics." As Huang and Ding (1997) put it,
"marketization does not necessarily lead to a loss of control; the existence of control does
not necessarily impede the development of mass media on their own terms" (p. 19). We
can see that a neoliberal communication system does not necessarily lead to social and
political freedom and ultimate democratization, although it might make the party more
difficult to sustain its authoritarian control. Unfortunately, democracy, "social justice",
and the participating "public sphere" are not promoted in China's contradictory media
environment. Chinese people have to endure both the psychology of socialist ideological
control and materialistic commercialism.
7.2 Where to go?
Both the political economy theoretical perspective and CDA methodology have "an
historic commitment to praxis" (Mosco, 1999, p. 104) and provide guides for human
action. Keeping their emancipatory potential in mind, I do hope to find out the inspiration
for resistance and directions in future research.
In the foreseeable future, the party will continue to deepen the reforms and opening
up policy, which means the Chinese communication system will go on to conduct
capitalist neoliberalist operations. At the same time the party will never relinquish its
control of the media, because the party believes that the media are the most effective
apparatus to both realize and rationalize its political manipulation. The struggle over
equality, free speech, and, ultimately, democracy has to be both anti-authoritarian and
anti-capitalist (Yin, 2006). But in an authoritarian society, where protests and any other
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meaningful opposition are forbidden, overt activism aimed at anti-authoritarian
governance can itself be dangerous and thus ineffective. One way to create more space for
the public sphere would be to have academia call on mainstream media to provide more
alternative perspectives and informative content to serve the majority of the Chinese
people rather than political elites, business interests, and the wealthy urbanite. It will be a
long, hard, and indirect way to go, but at least it is not a dead-end.
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Appendix: List of Abbreviations
BBC

British Broadcasting Corporation

CCTV

China Central Television

CDA

Critical Discourse Analysis

CITC

China International Television Corporation

CPC

Communist Party of China

CNR

China National Radio

EU

European Union

FAIR

Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting

FCC

Federation Communications Commission

GATT

General Agreement of Trade and Tariff

HRW

Human Rights Watch

NCCPC

National Congress of the Communist Party of China

NCPPCC

National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference

NPC

National People's Congress

SARFT

State Administration of Radio, Film and Television

SEZ

special economic zone

SOE

state-owned enterprise

WTO

World Trade Organization

XWLB

XinWen Lianbo (National News Network)
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